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I. INTRODUCTION'
In this article, attorneys with Hawai'i practices principally focused on
insurance law comment on some of the major cases during the two decades
when Chief Justice Moon led the court.2 Chief Justice Moon's Supreme Court
resolved several fundamental questions about insurance,3 and its contributions
will have an enduring impact on Hawai'i insurance law.
Although the cases discussed are considered important in Hawai'i, many of
the legal questions that the court addressed had already been decided in other
jurisdictions, so the court broke little new ground. In most instances, the court
adopted a moderately pro-insured position, often specifically rejecting more
liberal or conservative positions.
Indicative of that moderate trend is the court's approach to the reasonable
expectations doctrine. Heralded forty years ago as an insurance doctrine that
might correct the imbalance of power between insured and insurer, Professor
and Judge Robert E. Keeton first stated the principle: "[t]he objectively
reasonable expectations of applicants and intended beneficiaries of the terms of
insurance contracts will be honored even though painstaking study of the policy
provisions would have negated those expectations."4 Over the years, some
1 The introduction was principally authored by Professor Hazel G. Beh, William S.
Richardson School of Law, University of Hawai'i at Minoa.
2 Tred Eyerly, an attorney with Damon Key Leong Kupchak Hastert LLP, has practiced
insurance law in Hawai'i since 2001 and has also practiced in Alaska and Saipan. Keith
Hiraoka, an attorney with Roeca Luria Hiraoka LLP, has practiced insurance law in Hawai'i
since 1983. Peter Olson, an attorney with Cades Schutte LLP, has practiced insurance law in
Hawai'i since 1983. Michael Tanoue, an attorney with the Pacific Law Group, has practiced
insurance law in Hawai'i since 1986. Alan Van Etten, an attorney with Deeley King Pang &
Van Etten, has practiced insurance law in Hawai'i since 1984.
3 University of Hawai'i Law Review student notes on two important cases are extensive,
scholarly, and thorough. See Lane Christine Boyarski, Note, The Best Place, Inc. v. Penn
America Insurance Company: Hawai'i Bad Faith Cause ofAction for Insurer Misconduct, 19
U. HAW. L. REV. 845 (1997); Allison M. Mizuo, Note, Finley v. Home Insurance Co.: Hawaii's
Answer to the Troubling Tripartite Problem, 22 U. HAW. L. REv. 675 (2000).
4 Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights At Variance With Policy Provisions: Part One,
83 HARV. L. REV. 961, 967 (1970). See also Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights At
Variance With Policy Provisions: Part Two, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1970).
University ofHawai'i Law Review / Vol. 33:779
jurisdictions have squarely rejected it, others have used a strong substantive
form of it that "privileges the Insured's reasonable expectations above the
explicit language of the contract,"5 and others have used a lesser form,
regarding it merely as an interpretative tool when confronted with a contract
ambiguity or some other justifying circumstances. In the 1980s, Hawai'i cited
and invoked the doctrine, but it was unclear in what camp Hawai'i stood.6
During the Moon years, the reasonable expectations doctrine continued to be
invoked within a frequently recited catechism of insurance contract
interpretation; however, the author's view is that Hawai'i's construction
squarely places it in the "weak" form camp to date.7
Moderate, cautious, and mainstream best sums up the Moon Court's
insurance cases. Cases involving alleged insurer misconduct reveal a persistent
optimism that mechanisms within the existing tort and regulatory system will
suffice to check abuse without judicial imposition of novel torts or punitive
measures.
Looking forward, I question whether these middle ground choices will
achieve optimal outcomes. Insurance is a complex product marketed by
sophisticated and powerful corporations that sometimes wield power and
influence more akin to governmental action than private endeavor. Insurance is
5 Dudi Schwartz, Interpretation and Disclosure in Insurance Contracts, 21 Loy.
CONSUMER L. REv. 105, 128 (2008) (describing strong, weak, and intermediate approaches of
the reasonable expectations rule).
6 In analyzing Hawai'i opinions from the 1980s, Professor Roger Henderson wrote, "one
must admit the possibility that the Hawai'i court views the doctrine more as a rule of
construction and may not embrace its broader, substantive application." Roger C. Henderson,
The Doctrine ofReasonable Expectations in Insurance Law After Two Decades, 51 OHIO ST.
L.J. 823, 831-32 (1990).
The court typically recites the reasonable expectations doctrine as an interpretative tool
together with the plain meaning doctrine and contra proferentum. For example:
It is well settled in Hawai'i that the objectively reasonable expectations of policyholders
and intended beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance contracts will be honored
even though painstaking study of the policy provisions would have negated those
expectations. These "reasonable expectations" are derived from the insurance policy
itself, which is subject to the general rules of contract construction. This involves
construing the policy according to the entirety of its terms and conditions, and the terms
themselves should be interpreted according to their plain, ordinary, and accepted sense in
common speech unless it appears from the policy that a different meaning was intended.
Because insurance policies are contracts of adhesion and are premised on standard forms
prepared by the insurer's attorneys, we have long subscribed to the principle that they
must be construed liberally in favor of the insured and any ambiguities must be resolved
against the insurer.
Del Monte Fresh Produce, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins., 117 Haw. 357, 183 P.3d 734 (2007)
(internal brackets, ellipses, quotation marks, and citations omitted).
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vital to safeguarding the financial future of individuals and the nation; it is far
8
more than a private contractual relationship between an insured and a business.
Young v. Allstate Insurance Co.,9 a 2008 case that broke no new ground but
could have, compels the question whether the middle path was the right path.
In Young, the court had the opportunity to recognize a novel cause of action by
third parties against insurers. The court declined to do so, even on particularly
compelling facts. In 1998, an Allstate insured fell asleep at the wheel of his car
and rear-ended eighty-four-year-old Priscilla Young's 1984 Ford.10 Young's
car was totaled and Young suffered substantial injuries that limited her
activities of daily living and caused depression." Although Young was not
Allstate's insured, Allstate began a campaign to induce Young to settle the suit
for far less than her actual damages.
The court described several of Allstate's alleged national practices, including
its strategic direct contact with the victim designed to elicit the victim's trust
that Allstate would deal fairly when its purposeful intention was not to be fair.'2
Among other things, Allstate's dealings with third-party victims encouraged
them not to retain an attorney but to deal directly with Allstate.'3 At the same
time, Allstate allegedly used a computerized valuation program that
consistently undervalued claims.14 Allstate, adhering to its claims model,
rigidly made low settlement offers to victims, even against the advice of local
counsel. 1
Moreover, if accident victims hired attorneys to press their claims, Allstate's
litigation stance was deliberately tyrannical.
If a settlement offer were not accepted or the claimant hired an attorney, Allstate
would fully litigate virtually every claim, irrespective of its insured's liability or
8 In a series of compelling articles, Professor Jeffrey Stempel demonstrates that courts
should not merely view the insurance policy through the lens of contract law. He explains, "In
addition to functioning as contracts, products, and statutes, insurance policies exist as social
institutions or social instruments that serve important, particularized functions in modem
society-often acting as adjunct arms of governance and reflecting social and commercial
norms." Jeffrey Stempel, Insurance as a Social Instrument and Social Institution, 51 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 1489, 1492 (2010). See also Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as
Statute, 41 McGEORGE L. REV. 203 (2010) [hereinafter Stempel, Insurance Policy as Statute]
(discussing the statute-like qualities of insurance policies, justifying and implicating a statutory
interpretation approach); Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Thing, 44 ToRT& TRIAL
INs. PRAc. L.J. 813 (2009) (discussing "product-like" aspects of an insurance policy).
9 119 Haw. 403, 198 P.3d 666 (2008).
10 Id. at 408, 198 P.3d at 671.
1 Id.
12 Id. at 406-08, 198 P.3d at 669-7 1.
" Id. at 408, 198 P.3d at 671.
14 Id. at 407, 198 P.3d at 670.
" Id. at 408, 198 P.3d at 671.
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the real physical harm and value of the injuries suffered by the claimant. Allstate
thereby sought to subject claimants to unnecessary and oppressive litigation and
expenses, or, in other words, "scorched-earth litigation tactics." Allstate intended
to force claimants and their attorneys through arbitration and trial unnecessarily.
For example, if a non-binding arbitration award were anything more than
nominal, Allstate's practice was to appeal the award. The insurer employed these
tactics to discourage claimants from pursuing injury claims. Allstate also sought
to discourage attorneys from representing claimants by creating so much work
and expense that they could not afford to advocate for a client with minor,
moderate, or sometimes even serious injuries.' 6
In the underlying accident case, Young eventually did hire an attorney and
secured a nearly $200,000 judgment by jury trial.17 Allstate's best and final
settlement offer never exceeded $5,300.18
Young filed suit against Allstate and its local attorney, claiming, among other
things,' 9 that Allstate's conduct amounted to a tort that the plaintiff cast as
"malicious defense." 2 0 Justice Nakayama, writing the majority decision of a
divided court, refused to recognize the new tort.2 1 The court took a gladiator-
like view of litigation; and in doing so, championed an insurer's right to
vigorously defend itself. In distinguishing malicious defense from the tort of
malicious prosecution, the majority reasoned that the initiation of a suit, and not
conduct during a suit, gives rise to a claim of malicious prosecution.22 Once
haled into court, litigation is no-holds barred in the majority's view. "The tort
of malicious prosecution acknowledges the special, particular harms that a
defendant suffers when a lawsuit is maliciously initiated against it."2 3 In
rejecting the tort, the majority viewed the plaintiff (in this case Priscilla Young)
as choosing to be a litigant and voluntary assuming the attendant risks that
Allstate would relentlessly defend itself. The court expressed concern that
recognition of the tort of malicious defense might inhibit a defendant's ability
6 Id. at 407, 198 P.3d at 670.
" Id. at 409, 198 P.3d at 672.
18 Id.
1 "Young asserted Defendants were liable for, among other things, (1) abuse of process, (2)
malicious defense, and (3) IIED, and that Allstate had breached an assumed duty of good faith
and fair dealing. For each claim, she requested compensatory and punitive damages." Id. at
410, 198 P.3d at 673. The Hawai'i Supreme Court remanded the case on the intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim. Id. at 430, 198 P.3d at 693.
As a general rule, third party suits against insurers are not allowed. See Olokele Sugar
Co. v. McCabe, Hamilton & Renny Co., 53 Haw. 69, 487 P.2d 769 (1971) (an injured person
has no cause of action against a liability insurer in the absence of a contractual or statutory
provision authorizing direct action).
20 Young, 119 Haw. at 411, 198 P.3d at 674.
21 Id. at 416-17, 198 P.3d at 679-80.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 418, 198 P.3d at 681.
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to defend itself vigorously.24 This view, however, ignores the fact that absent
sanctions, an insurer benefits the less it pays and the longer it withholds paying
valid claims. In fact, the legislature has defined unfair settlement practices to
include "[n]ot attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair, and equitable
settlements of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear."2 5
Following a recurrent theme in its insurance cases, 26 the court declared that
existing judicial and regulatory mechanisms were adequate to remedy insurer
misconduct. It noted that the insurer and its attorney's conduct were
sufficiently governed by existing court rules and statutes to check misconduct
and tort laws to remedy it. 2 7 "In light of the plethora of remedies available to
plaintiffs when defendants' litigation tactics are brought in bad faith, and
because we should not chill the defendants' right "to conduct a vigorous
defense," we decline to adopt the tort of malicious defense." 2 8 The court
regarded a judge's inherent authority over the conduct of litigation to be
sufficient to curb the abuses of insurers and their attorneys.2 9 The court
declined to join New Hampshire and become the second state to recognize the
tort,30 even though it could have limited its application to insurance as it had the
tort of bad faith in Best Place.
Young exposed a systematic insurance practice that makes one question
whether any court can adequately protect consumers, let alone whether a
24 id.
25 HAW. REv. STAT. § 431:13-103(a)(l l)(H) (2005).
26 See, e.g., Finley v. Home Ins. Co., 90 Haw. 25, 34, 975 P.2d 1145, 1154 (1998)
(rejecting the need for Cumis counsel in Hawai'i and expressing the view that an attorney acting
in accord with the Rules of Professional Responsibility can adequately safeguard insured from
inappropriate insurer interference and that sufficient remedies exist to discourage misconduct);
Sentinel Ins. Co. v. First Ins. Co., 76 Haw. 277, 875 P.2d 894 (1994) (rejecting the blanket rule
that prohibits an insurer from litigating coverage following a breach of the duty to defend
because other lesser remedies are adequate).
27 The Supreme Court of Hawai'i explained:
By rejecting the tort of malicious defense, we are by no means authorizing or condoning
malicious action on the part of a defendant. In our view, however, such offenses are
sufficiently deterred by Hawaii's rules and statutes that authorize the court to sanction the
malicious defendant. Accordingly, the tort of malicious defense is unnecessary.
Young, 119 Haw. at 423, 198 P.3d at 686 (internal citations and footnotes omitted).
28 Id. at 426, 198 P.3d at 689.
29 Id. at 423, 198 P.3d at 686.
30 See Aranson v. Schroeder, 671 A.2d 1023, 1028-29 (N.H. 1995); see also William
Jordan, Court Declines to Recognize Cause of Action for "Malicious Defense," 34
PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY REPORTER 6 (Feb. 2009) (identifying Aranson as the only case
recognizing the tort of malicious defense).
31 Best Place, Inc. v. Penn Am. Ins. Co., 82 Haw. 120, 132, 920 P.2d 334, 346 (1996).
However, the court did allow Young to proceed against Allstate and its attorney on a theory of
intentional infliction of emotional distress because of the extent of direct contact with her and
the failed promises it made to her. Young, 119 Haw. at 429, 198 P.3d at 692.
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moderate judicial approach is prudent. Young suggests that the gross
imbalance of power between insurers and consumers warrants a strongly pro-
insured judicial stance. After all, for every litigated case where insurers
wrongfully delay payment, refuse to settle, decline an owed defense or
coverage, or manipulate defense counsel, there are many more instances that do
not even reach the court.
With Young, perhaps we should ask whether our so-called existing plethora
of judicial and regulatory remedies can adequately protect consumers. As we
reflect on the insurance law decisions over the last two decades, the question
time will answer is whether, in choosing a middle ground, the court struck a
balance that sufficiently protected insureds without creating the moral hazards
that attend giving insureds more than they deserve under their agreements, or
whether the court overestimated the resources of consumer insureds and victims
and underestimated the power of insurers to work the system to their own
advantage.
The insurance industry's ability to "overrule" courts also compels adopting a
strong judicial preference for the insured's position. Through the Insurance
Services Office (ISO), the insurance industry's organization that drafts
standardized forms, insurers collectively respond to judicial decisions across
the nation by re-drafting insurance policies.32 Professor Jeffrey Stempel
observed that "[i]nsurance policies act, to a degree, as private legislation by
insurers controlling the shape and contour of coverage sold."33  Stempel
recounts the policy-drafting history of various coverage disputes such as Y2K,
terrorism, and asbestos litigation, explaining the process that insurers
collectively follow to cure what they fear are excessive exposures.34 Stempel
notes that policyholders have less power in the drafting process because
"[i]nsurer groups or affiliated organizations (such as ISO) are not, of course,
representative democracies. If insurers dislike judicial decisions they regard as
excessively expanding coverage, their efforts to amend the policy language in
question will not be impeded by any legislative caucus of policyholder
representatives."35 He notes that, while ISO and insurers, as a matter of sound
business sense, include token representation of insureds and government
regulators during drafting, "policyholders and the government are powerless to
prevent insurers from revising policy language if the insurers determine this to
be the best response to disfavored judicial precedent."3 6 Thus, the industry has
a power to affect the future in ways that policyholders and even the courts
32 Stempel, Insurance Policy as Statute, supra note 8, at 206.
3 Id. at 215.
34 Id. at 206.
3 Id. at 248.
36 Id.
784
2011 / INSURANCE LA WAND THE MOON COURT
cannot. The insurer's ability to respond to negative decisions justifies a heavy
judicial thumb in favor of insureds on the scales of justice in these cases.
In the following sections, insurance practitioners discuss both the practical
and policy implications of some of the more important insurance cases of the
Moon years. The Moon Court took up a number of important and unresolved
questions regarding coverage and defense and provided more certainty in this
dynamic area of practice. In Finley v. Home Insurance Co.37 and Delmonte v.
State Farm Fire and Casualty Co.,38 discussed in Part II of this article, the
court settled a basic question about professional conduct that vexed Hawai'i for
years: when an insurer selects and pays for counsel to defend an insured, does
that counsel represent the insurer, the insured, or both? The court adopted the
rule that insurance defense counsel represents only the insured, rejecting the
dual representation model a majority of courts follow.
In Sentinel Insurance Co., Ltd. v. First Insurance Co. ofHawai'i, Ltd.3 and
Dairy Road Partners v. Island Insurance Co., Ltd.,40 discussed in Part III, the
court clarified just what "potential for coverage" means in establishing when
and whether the liability insurer's duty to defend its insured is triggered.
In Sentinel and Hawaiian Holiday Macadamia Nut Co. v. Industrial
Indemnity Co.,4 1 discussed in Part IV, the court provided important guidance on
the meaning of an "occurrence" under a CGL policy in Hawai'i.
In Best Place, Inc. v. Penn America Insurance Co.,42 discussed in Part V of
this article, the court finally recognized the tort of insurance bad faith, joining
an overwhelming majority of states that had concluded that the unique status of
insurers vis-a-vis their insureds justified potential exposure to tort liability for
misconduct.
Part VI of this article addresses Moon Court decisions regarding Hawai'i's
motor vehicle insurance law in three respects: decisions that defined-indeed
broadened-the universe of who qualifies as an "insured" or "covered person";
decisions clarifying the number of "per person" or "each person" limits
available to claimants who are not actually involved "in" motor vehicle
accidents; and decisions guiding the settlement of underinsured motorists'
insurance claims.
3 90 Haw. 25, 975 P.2d 1145 (1998).
3 90 Haw. 39, 975 P.2d 1159 (1999).
39 76 Haw. 277, 875 P.2d 894 (1994).
40 92 Haw. 398, 992 P.2d 93 (2000).
41 76 Haw. 166, 872 P.2d 230 (1994).
42 82 Haw. 120, 920 P.2d 334 (1996).
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II. ETHICAL ISSUES RELATING TO AN ATTORNEY'S
REPRESENTATION OF THE INSURED 43
Most liability insurance policies include duty to defend provisions, and
typically those provisions provide the insurer with the right to select defense
counsel and control the defense." Customarily, the appointed defense counsel
comes from an approved "panel" of attorneys. Attorneys on that panel will be
familiar with the insurer's reporting requirements, defense practices and
policies, and the insurer's billing guidelines and instructions. Frequently, the
lawyer's relationship with the insurance company is a longstanding one; and he
or she may have developed personal relationships and friendships with the
claims professionals who work there. Implicitly, one of the lawyer's goals is to
maintain that business relationship and, with it, the prospect of future case
assignments. The lawyer's relationship with the insured, on the other hand, is
more short-lived and is ordinarily confined to the defense of a single lawsuit.
When an insurer appoints counsel to defend its insured against a claim, who
is the client in this situation? Is it the insured or the insurer? Or, as some
jurisdictions hold, does the attorney engage in a dual representation, creating an
attorney-client relationship with both?45 When an insurer provides a defense
under a reservation of rights,46 as frequently happens, does this, by itself, create
43 The principal author of this section is Honolulu attorney Peter Olson of Cades Schutte
LLP.
4 Typical policy language expresses defense of the claim both as an insurer's right and
duty, and the appointment of counsel as a right. For example:
If a claim is made or a suit is brought against an insured for damages because of bodily
injury or property damage caused by an occurrence to which this coverage applies, we
will:
1. pay up to our limit of liability for the damages for which the insured is legally
liable; and
2. provide a defense at our expense by counsel of our choice, even if the suit is
groundless, false or fraudulent. We may investigate and settle any claim or suit
that we decide is appropriate. Our duty to settle or defend ends when the amount
we pay for damages resulting from the occurrence equals our limit of liability.
See Ins. Servs. Office, Homeowners 3 Special Form, HO 00 03 0491, reprinted in ALLIANCE OF
AMERICAN INSURERS, THE INSURANCE PROFESSIONAL'S POLICY KIT: A COLLECTION OF SAMPLE
INSURANCE FORMS 38 (2000) (emphases in original).
45 For an excellent overview of the many legal and ethical issues relating to an attorney's
representation of the insured, see Douglas R. Richmond, Walking a Tightrope: The Tripartite
Relationship between Insurer, Insured and Insurance Defense Counsel, 73 NEB. L. REv. 265
(1994). See also Mizuo, supra note 3.
46 Liability insurers commonly use reservation of rights letters to provide notice to insureds
that even though the insurer is handling or defending a claim, some or all of the losses claimed
by the plaintiff may not be covered by the policy and the insurer is preserving or "reserving" its
right to deny coverage at a later date. Finley v. Home Ins. Co., 90 Haw. 25, 975 P.2d 1145
(1998); Delmonte v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 90 Haw. 39, 975 P.2d 1159 (1999); AIG
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a conflict of interest between the insurer and insured and allow the insured to
select counsel of his or her own choice? The Moon Court provided some
clarity to these vexing questions in a pair of decisions decided in late 1998 and
early 1999: Finley v. Home Insurance Co.4 7 and Delmonte v. State Farm Fire
& Casualty Co.4 8 Finley decided that an attorney representing an insured has
only one client-the insured-even though the insurance company has selected
the attorney and will pay for the legal services. With that decision, the court
placed its trust in the integrity of Hawai'i's legal professional to place the
interests of an insured client first, without regard to the lawyer's business
relationship with the insurer. Weeks later, Delmonte delivered a warning to
lawyers who do not scrupulously follow the mandates of Finley.
A. Finley
The Finley case addressed the issue of whether an insured defended by the
insurer under a reservation of rights is entitled to reimbursement for the costs of
independent counsel retained by the insured, sometimes referred to as "Cumis"
counsel. 4 9 The plaintiffs, James and Vanida Finley, sued their employer for
wrongful termination.so The employer carried a workers' compensation
insurance policy through Hawaiian Insurance & Guaranty Co., Ltd., which had
Haw. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 78 Haw. 174, 177, 891 P.2d 261, 264 (1995) (holding that an insurance
company "may initially assume the unconditional defense of an insured while it performs its
own reasonable investigation to determine whether coverage exists. . . . Once the insurer
receives information concerning the possible absence of coverage, the insurer must promptly
serve upon the insured a reservation of rights").
47 90 Haw. 25, 975 P.2d 1145.
48 90 Haw. 39, 975 P.2d 1159.
49 Under the so-called Cumis doctrine, an insurer that defends the insured under a
reservation of rights must retain and pay for independent counsel selected by the insured. San
Diego Navy Fed. Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Soc., Inc., 208 Cal. Rptr. 494 (App. 1984).
Because it led to some abusive billing and defense practices by the insured's selected defense
counsel, the Cumis doctrine came under much criticism from the insurance industry and was
subsequently codified and modified by statute in California. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 2860 (West
2011). Under the statute, a conflict of interest exists-and the insured is entitled to the
appointment of independent counsel-where the insurer's reservation of rights turns on an issue
that can be controlled by defense counsel appointed by the insurer. Id. A conflict does not
exist, however, merely because the insurer has reserved rights on an issue independent of those
that will be litigated in the underlying case. In situations where the insured is entitled to the
appointment of independent counsel, the insurer: is only required to pay the hourly rates
customarily paid by the insurer for appointed defense counsel; may require that independent
counsel selected by the insured possesses certain minimum qualifications; and may require that
the attorney carries malpractice insurance. Id.
50 Finley, 90 Haw. at 27, 975 P.2d at 1147.
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become insolvent.5 ' Pursuant to the Hawai'i insurance code, 52 the Hawai'i
Insurance Guaranty Association (HIGA) assumed the handling of the claim.
Prior to tendering the defense of the wrongful termination action to HIGA,
however, the employer retained its own independent personal counsel to defend
it in the action.5 HIGA accepted the employer's tender under a reservation of
rights letter but appointed its own panel counsel to defend the case. 54 The
Finleys and the employer later entered into a stipulated judgment to settle the
action. As part of the settlement, the employer assigned the stipulated
judgment to the Finleys, including its claim against HIGA to recover the fees of
its independent counsel, which HIGA had refused to pay.55 The Finleys sued
HIGA to recover those unreimbursed fees.
The circuit court granted HIGA's motion for summary judgment and
dismissed the Finleys' claim.5 7 On appeal, however, the Hawai'i Intermediate
Court of Appeals (ICA) vacated the circuit court's ruling and held:
[W]here a conflict of interest arises between an insurer and an insured, because
the insurer has reserved its right to assert noncoverage at a later date, the insurer
is required to pay for independent counsel for the insured.
[A] reservation of rights can create a conflict of interest if 'the insurer's
reservation of rights on the ground of noncoverage [is] based on the nature of the
insured's conduct, which as developed at trial would affect the determination as
to coverage.' When such a conflict of interest exists, the insurer is obligated to
either obtain informed consent of the insured to the conflict of interest, or must
pay the reasonable cost for hiring independent counsel by the insured.58
The Hawai'i Supreme Court granted certiorari to address two issues: (1)
whether a conflict of interest arises when an insurer defends its insured under a
reservation of rights based on the nature of the insured's conduct; and (2) if so,
the appropriate remedy for such a conflict, whether actual or perceived.59 The
Hawai'i Supreme Court reversed the ICA's vacatur and affirmed the circuit
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of HIGA.o
According to the Hawai'i Supreme Court, the fundamental flaw with the case
law recognizing a right to independent counsel, as embraced by Cumis and its
51 Id.
52 HAW. REv. STAT. § 431:16-108 (1993).
s3 Finley, 90 Haw. at 27, 975 P.2d at 1147.
54 id
" Id. at 28, 975 P.2d at 1148.
56 Id.
58 Id. at 29, 975 P.2d at 1149.
s9 Id.
60 Id. at 39, 975 P.2d at 1159.
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progeny, was that these cases implicitly assume that an insurer-appointed
defense attorney is engaging in a dual representation, i.e., that both the insurer
and the insured are the attorney's client.61 The court, however, held that when
an attorney is appointed by an insurer to represent its insured, the attorney's
sole client is the insured. The court noted that this was "a matter of substantive
state law" and looked to the Hawai'i Rules of Professional Conduct (HRPC) for
guidance.62 The better solution to the Cumis problem, the Finley court held, is
not to engage in a conflict of interest analysis, but instead to rely upon the
integrity of appointed defense counsel and his or her rigorous adherence to the
rules of professional responsibility.63 The court emphasized that an attorney
who represents the insured must not allow the insurer to interfere with that
attorney-client relationship."
Thus, the court held an attorney has only one client and that client is the
insured. Ethical obligations require the lawyer to place the insured's interest
above the lawyer's own practical interests in preserving good relations with the
insurer paying for the legal services.
The court recognized that under the insurance contract between the insurer
and the insured, the insurer typically retains a contractual right to control the
defense of the case. 65 Nonetheless, the insurer's desire to limit the costs of
defending the insured "must yield to the attorney's professional judgment and
his or her responsibility to provide competent, ethical representation to the
insured."66
Although the insurer retains the contractual right to appoint defense counsel,
Finley also holds that the insured retains the right to reject that appointment.
61 Id. at 32, 975 P.2d at 1152.
62 Id. at 32-33, 975 P.2d at 1152-53. The Hawai'i Supreme Court characterized this rule as
the "modem view," id at 33, 975 P.2d at 1153, but according to one legal treatise, the Hawai'i
rule is apparently the minority rule. See 4 R. MALLEN & J. SmiTH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 30:3
(2008) (footnote omitted).
63 Finley, 90 Haw. at 31-32, 975 P.2d at 1151-52. As the court would outline in Finley,
there are a host of ethical rules that provide guidance to appointed defense counsel. See HAw.
R. PROF'L CONDUCT 1.2 (relating to scope of representation), 1.4 (relating to client
communications), 1.5 (relating to fees), 1.6 (relating to confidentiality of information), 1.7
(relating to conflicts of interest), 1.8 (relating to prohibited transactions), and 5.4 (relating to
professional independence). The Finley and Delmonte decisions subsequently generated two
Hawai'i Disciplinary Board opinions that are relevant to the role of insurance defense counsel.
See ODC Formal Op. 36 (1999) (addressing the scope ofpermissible disclosure of confidential
client information); ODC Formal Op. 37 (1999) (relating to insurer-issued billing guidelines).
64 Id at 33, 975 P.2d at 1153.
61 Id. at 31 n.9, 975 P.2d at 1151 n.9 (citation omitted).
66 Id. at 34, 975 P.2d at 1154.
67 Id. at 35, 975 P.2d at 1155. The Finley decision does not make clear whether the burden
to inform the insured of his or her right to reject the insurer's appointment of defense counsel
falls upon the insurer or rests with appointed defense counsel. Logically, it would seem that the
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If the insured chooses to conduct the defense, then the insured is responsible
for all defense costs. The insurer is still obligated to indemnify the insured as
to any judgment or settlement falling within the scope of coverage under the
policy.
To avoid any temptation defense counsel might have in caving in to the
insurer's possible desire to minimize litigation costs and provide a "token"
defense, or to possibly slant the defense toward a claim that is not covered by
insurance, the court enumerated the alternate remedies available to the insured
where appointed defense counsel does not meet his or her ethical duties:
If the duties prescribed by the HRPC are not followed by retained counsel,
various remedies exist to protect the insured. These remedies include: (1) an
action against the attorney for professional malpractice; (2) an action against the
insurer for bad faith conduct; and (3) estoppel of the insurer to deny
indemnification.68
Finally, and of critical importance to a potential bad faith claim against the
insurer, the court held that an "enhanced" standard of good faith is applicable
where the insurer defends under a reservation of rights,69 which the court
explained as follows:
First, the company must thoroughly investigate the cause of the insured's
accident and the nature and severity of the plaintiffs injuries. Second, it must
retain competent defense counsel for the insured. Both retained defense counsel
and the insurer must understand that only the insured is the client. Third, the
company has the responsibility for fully informing the insured not only of the
reservation-of-rights defense itself, but of all developments relevant to his policy
coverage and the progress of his lawsuit. Information regarding progress of the
lawsuit includes disclosure of all settlement offers made by the company.
Finally, an insurance company must refrain from engaging in any action which
would demonstrate a greater concern for the insurer's monetary interest than for
the insured's financial risk.70
B. Delmonte
In Finley, the Hawai'i Supreme Court set out a template for how defense
counsel must defend the insured under a reservation of rights. In Delmonte, the
burden should fall on the insurer; however, defense counsel may want to have that right made
clear in the engagement letter with the insured.
68 id.
" Id. at 36, 975 P.2d at 1156 (adopting Tank v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 715 P.2d 1133
(Wash. 1986)).
7o Id. at 35-36, 975 P.2d at 1155-56 (emphases in original). The court observed that the
responsibility to communicate settlement offers to the insured is a duty "more properly placed
on the attorney, rather than the insurer." Id. at 36 n.12, 975 P.2d at 1156 n.12.
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court addressed some pitfalls that might arise during the course of such
representation.
The underlying dispute arose after the Delmontes sold their personal
residence in Kailua under a DROA.7 1 The buyers later sued the Delmontes for
alleged misrepresentations made in connection with the sale.72 The Delmontes
retained counsel to defend the action. 73 Later, the Delmontes also tendered the
defense of the action to their homeowner's insurer, State Farm, asserting that at
least some claims were covered under their homeowner's policy.7 4 Shortly
before trial was to begin on the action brought by the buyers, State Farm
appointed the law firm of Watanabe Ing & Kawashima (Watanabe) to represent
the Delmontes under a written reservation of rights.7s
Soon thereafter, Watanabe advised State Farm that, based upon its
investigation and evaluation of the case, the Delmontes would likely be found
liable and that there was a strong possibility that punitive damages would also
be awarded against the Delmontes.76 The buyers subsequently expressed a
willingness to settle the case for approximately $120,000." Mr. Delmonte
indicated he was willing to pay two-thirds of the settlement if State Farm paid
the other third. State Farm, however, declined to contribute anything toward
the settlement.79 A few months later, Mr. Delmonte sent Watanabe a letter
requesting that they perform certain work in connection with their defense of
the case.s Watanabe consulted with State Farm about Mr. Delmonte's request,
but State Farm declined to authorize the performance of the requested work.8 ,
The case proceeded to a bench trial, at which the Delmontes were jointly
represented by their personal counsel and Watanabe.82 The trial judge awarded
damages of almost $700,000 against the Delmontes, including punitive
damages of $500,000.83 Separate coverage counsel retained by State Farm
advised it that it had a duty to appeal the judgment if "reasonable grounds"
7' Delmonte v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 90 Haw. 39, 42, 975 P.2d 1159, 1162 (1999).
A Deposit, Receipt, Offer and Acceptance (DROA) is a standard form contract for the sale of
real property. Id.
72 id.
" Id. at 43, 975 P.2d at 1163.
74 Id.
7s Id. at 43-44, 975 P.2d at 1163-64.
76 Id at 44, 975 P.2d at 1164.
77 id.
78 id
79 id.
80 Id. at 45, 975 P.2d at 165.
81 id.
82 id
83 id
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existed for doing so. 84 State Farm then instructed Watanabe to prepare an
opinion letter as to the merits of an appeal and a recommendation as to whether
an appeal should be filed. However, State Farm also instructed Watanabe:
"'[w]hen you prepare the [opinion] letter, please do not conduct any research
and you need not detail every reason for or against your recommendation [as to
whether to pursue an appeal]."' 8 5
Watanabe filed a notice of appeal on behalf of the Delmontes, but then
withdrew the appeal at State Farm's direction, 6 after having sent State Farm a
letter advising that Watanabe did not see reasonable grounds for an appeal.87
The Delmontes' personal attorney, on the other hand, wrote to State Farm and
opined that there were reasonable grounds for appeal.88
Because the Delmontes were unable to afford a bond in order to stay the
execution of the judgment, they settled with the buyers by paying the full
amount of the judgment, plus interest-an amount totaling almost $765,000.9
The Delmontes then sued both State Farm and Watanabe, alleging: (1) breach
of contract by State Farm; (2) breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing
by State Farm; (3) that State Farm was liable for indemnification of the
settlement; (4) that State Farm breached its duty to provide counsel of their
choosing to the Delmontes and/or different counsel; (5) that State Farm was
estopped from denying coverage; (6) that Watanabe's representation of the
Delmontes was tainted by a conflict of interest between State Farm and the
Delmontes; and (7) that Watanabe breached its fiduciary duties to the
Delmontes.90
State Farm filed an answer and counterclaim, seeking a declaratoryjudgment
that it owed no duty to defend or indemnify the Delmontes and otherwise had
no liability for claims arising from the underlying lawsuit.9 '
The circuit court concluded that State Farm did not have a duty to prosecute
an appeal from the underlying judgment because none of the findings in the
judgment were covered claims under the applicable State Farm insurance
policies.92 The court also ruled that State Farm's insurance policies conferred
upon State Farm the right to select counsel.93 If Watanabe breached any duty
84 Id. State Farm's counsel advised State Farm to "seek a written opinion from defense
counsel as to the merits of an appeal and rely upon that opinion in deciding whether to continue
with the defense of the Delmontes." Id
as Id. (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 45-46, 975 P.2d at 1165-66.
Id. at 46, 975 P.2d at 1166.
Id. at 45, 975 P.2d at 1165.
89 Id. at 46, 975 P.2d at 1166.
90 Id
91 Id.
92 id.
9 Id. at 46-47, 975 P.2d at 1166-67.
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of care or loyalty to the Delmontes, their remedies rested in the malpractice
action against Watanabe. 94 The Delmontes appealed.95
Just a few weeks after the Finley opinion came out, the Hawai'i Supreme
Court issued its opinion in Delmonte, reaching several holdings.
First, the court ruled that the insurer's duty to defend includes a duty to
appeal an adverse judgment against the insured where reasonable grounds exist
for an appeal.96 State Farm was required to consider both Watanabe's opinion
that there were no reasonable grounds for an appeal, and the opinion expressed
by the Delmontes' personal counsel that there were. The court noted that
Watanabe's opinion was reached only after State Farm had given specific
instructions to not conduct any legal research. The court was troubled by the
implication that State Farm might have influenced how the law firm
represented the Delmontes.
Second, State Farm's potential liability for bad faith could not be determined
until there was a ruling on the malpractice claims against Watanabe. 99
Accordingly, the court reversed the summary judgment entered by the trial
court in favor of State Farm as to the Delmontes' bad faith claim. The court
explained:
If Watanabe's conduct of the defense breached its duties toward its client, the
Delmontes, then Watanabe may be liable for its breach. In addition, if such a
breach was causally induced by State Farm's actions, then State Farm may
potentially be liable for a breach of its duty of good faith and fair dealing.'00
Finally, the court noted that "[t]he circuit court's determination that
State Farm did not have a duty to defend the Delmontes d[id] not
foreclose the possibility of a cognizable bad faith claim. o
94 Id. at 47, 975 P.2d at 1167.
95 Id
96 Id. at 49, 975 P.2d at 1169.
97 Id.
98 id.
9 Id. at 54, 975 P.2d at I174.
o Id
'0 Id. at 55, 975 P.2d at 1175 (emphasis added). The Hawai'i Supreme Court also expressly
disapproved of State Farm's conduct in contacting the attorney representing the plaintiffs in the
underlying case and attempting to have him amend the complaint to remove the allegations that
triggered potential coverage under State Farm's insurance policies. No damage flowed from
this conduct, however, because the circuit denied the motion to amend, and State Farm
continued to defend through trial. Id. at 55-56, 975 P.2d at 1175-76.
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C. The Significance ofFinley and Delmonte
In declining to hold that a defense provided by an insurer under a reservation
of rights creates an irreconcilable conflict of interest between insurer and
insured and thereby requires the appointment of independent counsel, the
Moon Court squarely rejected the cynical view that appointed defense counsel
lacks the inherent ability to place the insured's interests above the attorney's
own interest in future employment by the insurer. As the court explained in
Finley, "[w]hen retained counsel, experienced in the handling of insurance
defense matters, is allowed full rein to exercise professional judgment, the
interests of the insured will be adequately safeguarded."' 02 In so holding, the
Moon Court made a clear if unspoken statement about its trust and confidence
in the integrity and ethics of the Hawai'i bar in general, the insurance defense
bar in particular, and provided some needed clarity to an area of the law that
was not without some confusion.
If Finley provided a legal framework for how appointed defense counsel
should represent the insured, Delmonte may be viewed as something of a
cautionary tale about the pitfalls that may result when defense counsel
succumbs to the temptation to subordinate the insured's interests to those of the
insurer. For attorneys who practice in this area, both Finley and Delmonte are
fruitful reading and hold some very important lessons.
Ill. DEFINING THE DUTY TO DEFEND 0 3
During Chief Justice Moon's tenure, the Hawai'i Supreme Court more fully
developed the contours of the liability insurer's duty to defend. In two key
cases, the court established that an insurer's obligation to defend exists where
policy language suggests any possibility of coverage based upon the allegations
in the underlying case. In assessing whether there is any possibility of
coverage, the court struck a moderate position, neither as expansive in favor of
insureds nor as narrow in favor of insurers as other jurisdictions have
constructed the duty to defend.
Under a commercial general liability (CGL)"'0 policy, defense of the insured
is regarded as both an insurer's right and a duty. The policy provides that an
insurer must defend a claim against an insured and pay claims as follows:
102 Finley v. Home Ins. Co., 90 Haw. 25, 34, 975 P.2d 1145, 1154 (1998).
103 The principal authors of this section were Honolulu attorneys Tred Eyerly of Damon Key
Leong Kupchak Hastert and Alan Van Etten of Deeley King Pang & Van Etten.
104 A CGL policy was formerly known as a "Comprehensive General Liability" policy. In
1986, the industry changed the name to "Commercial General Liability" policy to avoid its title
implying a broader scope of coverage than the policy provided. See ROBERT H. JERRY &
DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 517 (2007).
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[The insurer] will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall
become legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury or property
damage to which this insurance applies, caused by an occurrence and [the
insurer] shall have the right and duty to defend any suit against the insured
seeking damages on account of such bodily injury or property damage, even if
the allegations are groundless, false or fraudulent ... 105
The Moon Court considered when the insurer's duty to defend may be
triggered based upon the nature of the factual and legal allegations in the
underlying tort claim, as well as other circumstances that become evident
during the course of the investigation of that claim.10 6
A. Triggering the Insurer's Duty to Defend
Sentinel Insurance Co. v. First Insurance Co. of Hawai'i considered both
defense and indemnity obligations of multiple insurers issuing policies covering
periods where continuing bodily injury or property damage occurs.'07 Authored
by Chief Justice Moon, Sentinel also established a duty to defend where legal
uncertainty exists as to whether allegations in the underlying complaint are
potentially covered by the policy.'os
In Sentinel, an apartment owners' association sued an insured contractor and
developer, Honofed, alleging that defective design, construction, and materials
caused water infiltration and property damage to a building project completed
in April 1981.109 Notably, the parties disagreed as to when the water
infiltration and property damage began and how long it continued.o"0
Honofed was continuously insured under annual CGL policies alternately
issued by Sentinel and First Insurance from April 1981 to April 1988. When
the property owners filed suit, Honofed only tendered its defense to Sentinel,
which agreed to defend the suit under a reservation of rights."'
Although Sentinel accepted the defense, Sentinel informed Honofed that its
investigation revealed that much of the damage claimed was not covered by
Sentinel's policies because the damage appeared to have occurred during
periods of time outside Sentinel policy periods." 2 Consequently, Sentinel
105 Sentinel Ins. Co. v. First Ins. Co. of Haw., 76 Haw. 277, 287, 875 P.2d 894, 904 (1994)
(emphasis added).
106 Sentinel, 76 Haw. 277, 875 P.2d 894; Dairy Rd. Partners v. Island Ins. Co., 92 Haw. 398,
992 P.2d 93 (2000).
107 76 Haw. 277, 875 P.2d 894.
1o8 Id. at 287-290, 875 P.2d at 904-907.
109 Id. at 284, 875 P.2d at 901.
110 Id. at 284-285, 875 P.2d at 901-902.
" id. at 285, 875 P.2d at 902.
112 id
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advised Honofed to notify other liability insurers covering periods outside
Sentinel's policy periods.1 3 After Honofed notified First Insurance, the insurer
disclaimed any responsibility and refused to contribute to the defense.114 First
Insurance argued that the damage was "first discovered" at a time when First
was not "on the risk"; therefore, the entire risk should be allocated to the
insurer covering the first manifestation of the damage." 5
Ultimately, the underlying case settled for less than the policy limits under
any single year." 6 Sentinel and Honofed jointly contributed $75,000 to the
settlement, and Sentinel paid an additional $48,642.37 in attorneys' fees to
defend the underlying action." 7 Sentinel then filed suit against First Insurance
seeking contribution for the costs of defense and settlement."' 8 The circuit
court determined that because First Insurance had a duty to defend and
wrongfully failed to defend, it was obligated to contribute to the settlement and
defense costs.119
On appeal, the Hawai'i Supreme Court established the analytic framework to
determine whether an insurer has a duty to defend. The court first examined
the First Insurance policy language.120 Invoking an enduring tenet of insurance
law, the court instructed that insurance provisions defining the insurer's duty to
defend are construed broadly and liberally in favor of the insured:
"the obligation to defend . . . is broader than the duty to pay claims and arises
wherever there is the mere potential for coverage." . . . In other words, the duty
to defend "rests primarily on the possibility that coverage exists. This possibility
may be remote, but if it exists[,] the [insurer] owes the insured a defense." . . .
"All doubts as to whether a duty to defend exists are resolved against the insurer
and in favor of the insured[.]"' 2
Next the court tested the policy language versus the allegations of the
underlying claim against the insured to determine whether the allegations raised
the possibility that the insured would be entitled to indemnification under the
1i Id.
114 id.
"' Id. at 286, 875 P.2d at 903.
116 The settlement within a single policy limit means that another important legal issue
remains undecided. Other courts are divided on the high-stakes issue of how much coverage is
available when a tort continues over multiple coverage periods. Does the insured obtain the
coverage limit of a single policy, or can multiple policies be stacked to expand the amount
available? See Thomas M. Jones & Jon D. Hurwitz, An Introduction to Insurance Allocation
Issues in Multiple Trigger Cases, 10 VILL. ENvTL. L.J. 25 (1999) (discussing the apportionment
of liability for insureds with multiple insurance policies).
" Sentinel, 76 Haw. at 285, 875 P.2d at 902.
" Id. at 285-286, 875 P.2d at 902-903.
'19 Id. at 286, 875 P.2d at 903.
12o Id. at 287, 875 P.2d at 904.
121 Id. (emphases in original; internal citations omitted).
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policy.12 2 The underlying complaint against Honofed alleged that the property
was damaged by water infiltration caused by construction defects,123 but the
complaint did not specify whether the damage occurred during any particular
policy period.124 Relying on Standard Oil Co. of California v. Hawaiian
Insurance & Guaranty Co.,1 2 5 the court explained the following principle:
[a]n insurer must look beyond the effect of the pleadings and must consider any
facts brought to its attention or any facts which it could reasonably discover in
determining whether it has a duty to defend .... The possibility of coverage must
be determined by a good faith analysis of all information known to the insured or
126
all information reasonably ascertainable by inquiry and investigation.
Accordingly, a court must now conduct the following analysis to determine if
an insurer's refusal to defend is justified: (1) the court must review the relevant
policies and allegations of the underlying complaint, and (2) if the complaint is
not clear, the court must also review all information known to the insurer or
reasonably ascertainable by inquiry and investigation by the insurer at the time
it made its decision.12 7
Additionally, the court in Sentinel expanded the duty to defend beyond
factual possibilities raised by the underlying claim and held that the duty
encompassed possibilities raised by unsettled legal theories as well. At the time
First Insurance declined to defend based on a "manifestation of loss trigger,"
the law in Hawai'i was unsettled.12 8 In fact, whether the insurer providing
122 Id.
123 It is interesting to note that Sentinel never raised the question of whether construction
defects constitute an "occurrence" under the CGL policies at issue. See id., 76 Haw. 277, 875
P.2d 394. In contrast, the ICA recently decided that construction defects are not an
"occurrence" under a liability policy, but instead constitute a breach of contract by the insured,
thus eliminating the possibility of coverage. See Group Builders v. Admiral Ins. Co., 123 Haw.
142, 231 P.3d 67 (App. 2010).
124 A typical CGL policy defines property damage to include "physical injury to or
destruction of tangible property which occurs during the policy period, including loss of use
thereof at a time resulting therefrom... ." Sentinel, 76 Haw. at 287, 875 P.2d at 904 (emphasis
in original).
125 65 Haw. 521, 527, 654 P.2d 1345, 1349 (1982).
126 Sentinel, 76 Haw. at 288, 875 P.2d at 905 (quoting Standard Oil Co., 65 Haw. at 527,
654 P.2d at 1349).
127 Id. at 288, 875 P.2d at 905. The principle was later reinforced by the court's decision in
Tri-S Corp. v. Western World Insurance Co., 110 Haw. 473, 497, 135 P.3d 82, 106 (2006).
128 The relevant policies provided indemnification for "occurrences" that resulted in property
damage "which occurs during the policy period." The court explained that under the
manifestation of loss trigger, "property damage occurs when the latent defect first manifests
itself, and the insurer on the risk at the time of first manifestation is solely liable for the entire
loss, even if the property damage progresses after the policy expires." Sentinel, 76 Haw. at 297,
875 P.2d at 914 (quoting Chemstar, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 797 F. Supp. 1541, 1548-49
(C.D. Cal. 1992)). The court eventually adopted the injury-in-fact trigger. Id. at 298-99, 875
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coverage at the time of manifestation was solely responsible for the entire loss,
even though a portion of the loss extended into subsequent policy periods, was
a subject of dispute nationwide.129
The court rejected First Insurance's position on two grounds. The court not
only rejected the "manifestation of loss" as the preferred causation theory when
damage is ongoing, 30 it also held that insurers must defend insureds in the face
of an unanswered question of law. The court explained, "[t]he mere fact that
the answers to those questions in this jurisdiction were not then and are not
presently conclusively answered demonstrates that, based on the allegations in
the underlying action, it was possible that the Honofed entities would be
entitled to indemnification under the First Insurance policies."l 3 ' As the duty to
defend rests primarily on the possibility that coverage exists, the determination
that First Insurance had a duty to defend was affirmed. 13 2
The court then prescribed the consequences where the insurer wrongfully
refuses to defend: "Where the insured seeks indemnification after the insurer
has breached its duty to defend, (1) coverage is rebuttably presumed, (2) the
insurer bears the burden of proof to negate coverage, and (3) where relevant,
the insurer carries its traditional burden of proof that an exclusionary clause
applies." 3 3  These penalties reflect a moderate approach. The court
acknowledged that a "fair number of jurisdictions" adhere to a far more pro-
insured rule that prohibits an insurer from "taking the position that the
judgment or settlement did not involve a covered risk" after wrongfully
declining to defend. 134 However, drawing a sharp distinction between coverage
and the duty to defend, the court concluded that precluding a breaching insurer
from challenging coverage altogether would unfairly penalize an insurer and
might provide a windfall to the insured.13 5
P.2d at 915-16. Under this trigger, "an injury occurs whether detectable or not; in other words,
an injury need not manifest itself during the policy period, as long as its existence during that
period can be proven in retrospect." Id. at 298, 875 P.2d at 915.
129 Id. at 289, 875 P.2d at 906.
I30 Id. at 301, 875 P.2d at 918.
131 Id. at 290, 875 P.2d at 907 (emphasis in original).
132 Id. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals qualified Sentinel's legal ambiguity holding. In
Burlington Insurance Co. v. Oceanic Design & Construction, Inc., it held that under Sentinel
the mere fact that a legal question is unanswered in Hawai'i is insufficient to create a possibility
of coverage. 383 F.3d 940, 952-53 (9th Cir. 2004). Instead, the Ninth Circuit interpreted
Sentinel to require a "level of uncertainty" amounting to a "notable dispute nationwide" to
trigger coverage. Id. at 953.
133 Sentinel, 76 Haw. at 297, 875 P.2d at 914 (citing Polaroid Corp. v. Travelers Indem. Co.,
610 N.E.2d 912, 922 n.22 (Mass. 1993)).
114 Id. at 295, 875 P.2d at 912. In doing so, the court rejected Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co.,
419 P.2d 168 (Cal. 1966), and the so-called "Illinois Rule" that effectively precludes an insurer
that breaches the duty to defend from disputing grounds for coverage. Id.
13s Id.
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Chief Justice Moon's decision in Sentinel firmly establishes that the duty to
defend broadly exists whenever there is any possibility of coverage under the
policy language, whether that possibility exists based on unresolved facts or
law. In Sentinel, the court also struck a middle ground in prescribing the
consequences an insurer bears for breaching that duty, by nevertheless allowing
insurers to challenge whether the claim was covered. While the court imposed
some penalties upon insurers, particularly with regard to their burden of proof
on coverage, it stopped short of holding that once an insurer wrongfully refuses
to defend and abandons the insured, it loses its right to challenge the insured on
the coverage issue.
B. The Duty to Defend on Disputed Facts
Dairy Road Partners v. Island Insurance Co.,136 a unanimous opinion
authored by Justice Levinson, clarified the extent to which a liability insurer
could look beyond the pleadings to avoid the duty to defend. The underlying
facts in Dairy Road were straightforward. Garth Nakamura, the son of the
Kahului Shell station manager, was involved in an after-hour drinking binge at
the Shell station.'37 Thereafter, Nakamura was driving home when his vehicle
struck and killed pedestrian Alvin K. Vierra, Jr.13 8 Suits against Nakamura,
Shell, and Dairy Road alleged that Nakamura was employed by Dairy Road and
was acting within the scope of his employment when he caused the accident
that killed Vierra.139
Dairy Road was insured under four liability policies issued by Island
Insurance that potentially provided coverage for the defendants: (1) abusiness
auto policy; (2) a commercial garage liability policy; (3) a commercial general
liability policy; and (4) a commercial umbrella policy.14 0 The commercial
garage liability policy, under which a duty to defend was eventually found,
stated Island Insurance had "the right and the duty to defend any suit asking for
... damages. However we have no duty to defend suits for bodily injury or
property damage not covered by this policy."' 4 1 The policy considered
employees as insureds, but only while acting within the scope of their duties.142
136 92 Haw. 398, 992 P.2d 93 (2000).
13 Id. at 403, 992 P.2d at 98.
'3 Id. Shell was alleged to be vicariously liable but was apparently dismissed prior to the
appeal. Id. at 402 n.1, 992 P.2d at 97 n.1.
140 Id. at 403-04, 992 P.2d at 98-99. Only the issues related to defense under the garage
liability policy will be discussed here.
141 Id. at 405, 992 P.2d at 100.
142 id.
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Further, the policy only covered specific autos, including those of employees
while used in the insured's garage business.14 3
Dairy Road and Shell tendered the defense of the Vierra suit to Island
Insurance, but Island declined to assume their defense.'" Island maintained
that its investigation had revealed that prior to the accident Nakamura had been
off duty, drinking with friends, and driving his personal vehicle home from the
service station.14 5 Therefore, Island asserted that the accident was not covered
by Dairy Road's various liability policies.14 6
Dairy Road and Shell then filed suit seeking a declaration that Island was
obligated to defend and indemnify them in the underlying lawsuits.14 7 Island
moved for summary judgment. In support of its motion, Island included
portions of Nakamura's deposition in which Nakamura conceded that the
consumption of alcohol was not permitted at the station, that the gathering the
night of the accident was unauthorized, and that he was driving a friend home
from the after-hours party when the accident occurred. 14 8 The circuit court
denied Island's motion in part, holding that under the garage policy there was a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether Nakamura's actions were necessary
or incidental to the business.149
The parties appealed from lower court rulings on cross motions for summary
judgment. 50 The salient issue on appeal regarding the duty to defend on the
garage policy was whether Island could rely upon factual evidence outside the
complaint's allegations to terminate its duty to defend.' 5 ' Relying on Sentinel,
the Hawai'i Supreme Court reiterated that an insurer bears a heavy burden in
establishing that it has no duty to defend an insured. It again explained that an
insurer's duty is broad, arising whenever there is a possibility of coverage based
on the underlying claims, and that "[a]ll doubts [... .] are resolved against the
insurer and in favor of the insured."l 52 It noted that Island's burden of proof
was great, while Dairy Road's was slight:
Island bore the burden of proving that there was no genuine issue of material fact
with respect to whether a possibility existed that [Dairy Road] would incur
liability for a claim covered by the policies. In other words, Island was required
143 Id. at 406-407, 992 P.2d at 100-01.
'" Id. at 407, 992 P.2d at 102.
145 id
146 Id. at 407-08, 992 P.2d at 102-03.
147 Id. at 408, 992 P.2d at 103.
148 id.
149 Id. at 409-10, 992 P.2d at 104-05.
150 Id.
's' Id. at 413-14, 992 P.2d at 108-09.
152 Id. at 412, 992 P.2d at 107 (quoting Trizec Prop., Inc. v. Bitmore Constr. Co., 767 F.2d
810, 812 (11th Cir. 1985)).
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to prove that it would be impossible for the [underlying plaintiffs] to prevail
against [Dairy Road] in the underlying lawsuits on a claim covered by the
policies. Conversely, [Dairy Road]'s burden with respect to its motion for
summary judgment was comparatively light, because it had merely to prove that a
possibility of coverage existed. 53
Dairy Road then broke new ground in Hawai'i law by considering the extent
to which an insurer may rely on extrinsic evidence-evidence outside the
plaintiff's complaint-to determine whether it had a duty to defend. The gist of
the conflict in this case was that, while the complaint in the underlying lawsuit
alleged that Nakamura was acting within the course and scope of employment,
a fact which implicated garage operations under the insurance policy, the
uncontested facts adduced after the underlying complaint was filed established
that Nakamura was not acting in the course and scope of employment.' 54 Thus,
relying on extrinsic evidence would favor the insurer by negating rather than
creating a potential basis of coverage.
Just as it had done in Sentinel, the court again drew a sharp distinction
between the duty to defend and the duty to indemnify. While the duty to
defend is determined at the outset of the case and arises irrespective of the
outcome, the duty to indemnify turns on establishing liability at the outcome of
the underlying case.'5
The court emphasized that the duty to defend depends on finding any
possibility of coverage based on the policy language and the allegations in the
underlying complaint. 5 6 The court conceded that earlier decisions had left
Hawai'i law unclear as to the appropriate use of evidence beyond the
underlying pleadings to establish the insurer's duty to defend.15 7 It noted that
under the commercial garage liability policy, the underlying complaints
unambiguously triggered the possibility of coverage and therefore established a
duty to defend.158 Thus, in this case there was no need to rely on any extrinsic
evidence to trigger the duty to defend at the outset. 59
The court then explored the role of extrinsic evidence in establishing and
disclaiming a duty to defend. To begin with, the court continued adherence to
a rule first announced in Standard Oil Co. ofCalifornia v. Hawaiian Insurance
' Id. at 412-13, 992 P.2d at 107-08 (emphases in original; citation omitted).
154 Id. at 423, 992 P.2d at 118.
'. Id. at 413-14, 992 P.2d at 108-09.
156 Id.
'1 Id. at 415-17, 992 P.2d at 110-12 (discussing Hawaiian Ins. & Guar. Co. v. Blanco, 72
Haw. 9, 804 P.2d 876 (1990); Hawaiian Ins. & Guar. Co. v. Brooks, 67 Haw. 285,686 P.2d 23
(1984)).
.5. Id. at 414, 992 P.2d at 109.
" Id. at 415, 992 P.2d at I10.
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& Guaranty Co.,160 that when the underlying pleadings do not clearly allege a
covered claim, the insurer "must look beyond the effect of the pleadings and
must consider any facts brought to its attention" to establish a duty to defend.161
However, striking a moderate position, the court rejected cases in other
jurisdictions that more broadly impose upon insurers an obligation to assume a
defense where the pleadings unambiguously negate coverage but an
investigation of extrinsic facts would raise a possibility of coverage.16 2
The court next considered whether, once the duty to defend was triggered,
an insurer was permitted to use extrinsic evidence to overcome the duty to
defend. Island argued that a trio of earlier Hawai'i cases had allowed the
insurer to look beyond the pleadings and conduct a factual investigation in
order to avoid a duty to defend: Hawaiian Insurance & Guaranty Co. v.
Brooks; Hawaiian Insurance & Guaranty Co. v. Blanco;164 and Bayudan v.
Tradewind Inc. Co.16 ' The court noted that those cases attempted "to ensure
that plaintiffs could not, through artful pleading, bootstrap the availability of
insurance coverage under an insured defendant's policy by purporting to state a
claim for negligence based on facts that, in reality, reflected manifestly
intentional, rather than negligent, conduct."'66 But this time the court was
troubled by the unanticipated consequences that looking beyond the pleadings
could have on the duty to defend.16 7
The court decided that the implication of these cases went too far and might
deprive an insured of a deserved defense:
One consequence ... is that the insured may be saddled with the Procrustean
dilemma of being forced to adduce facts proving his or her own liability in the
underlying lawsuit in order to satisfy the insurer that there may be merit to the
underlying covered claim....
Additionally,.. . the potential for inconsistent judgments [exists]. A circuit
court presiding over a declaratory judgment action might rule, based on an
insurer's superior production of evidence concerning material facts that will be
directly in dispute in the underlying lawsuit, that there is no possibility of
coverage. Subsequently, the trier of fact in the underlying lawsuit, not bound by
160 65 Haw. 521, 654 P.2d 1345 (1982).
161 Dairy Road, 92 Haw. at 414, 992 P.2d at 109 (quoting Standard Oil Co., 65 Haw. at 526,
654 P.2d at 1349).
162 Id. at 415 n.9, 992 P.2d at 110 n.9 (noting and rejecting the more expansive view adopted
in Spruill Motors, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Insurance Co., 512 P.2d 403 (Kan. 1973), and
Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co., 419 P.2d 168 (Cal. 1966)).
163 67 Haw. 285, 686 P.2d 23 (1984).
'64 72 Haw. 9, 804 P.2d 876 (1990).
16' 87 Haw. 379, 957 P.2d 1061 (App. 1998).
166 Dairy Road, 92 Haw. at 417, 992 P.2d at 112.
167 Id.
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the ruling in the declaratory judgment action (the latter having no preclusive
effect upon a non-party putative plaintiff), and perhaps relying upon different
evidence adduced by the injured plaintiff, might find that the insured is liable on
a claim covered by the policy. Such a result would be fundamentally unfair to
the insured, inasmuch as, in retrospect, there must have been a possibility of
coverage if, in fact, it is so adjudicated in the underlying lawsuit. Inasmuch as
the circuit court would already have ruled that there was no possibility of
coverage, and therefore no duty to defend, the insured would be barred by res
judicata from recovering post-trial attorney's fees and costs from the insurer. 168
Noting a split of authority in other jurisdictions on whether an insurer may
use extrinsic evidence to disclaim its duty to defend, the court adopted the
majority rule: "the insurer may only disclaim its duty to defend by showing
that none of the facts upon which it relies might be resolved differently in the
underlying lawsuit."l 69 Accordingly, the court held that Dairy Road was
entitled to partial summary judgment on the duty to defend under the
commercial garage liability policy.o70  The court hedged a bit, however,
adopting a "limited exception" to the majority rule, allowing "an insurer to rely
upon extrinsic facts to disclaim liability only when the relevant facts 'will not
be resolved by the trial court of the third party's suit against the insured.', 17
In summary, Dairy Road expounded upon that basic principle of liability
insurance that insurers have a duty to defend whenever there is a potential for
coverage. It established rules for the use of extrinsic evidence in instances
where that evidence proves or disproves the possibility of coverage and
established a rule that is favorable to insureds. First, Dairy Road provided that
the duty to defend is principally determined by the claims in the underlying
case, and an insurer may not turn to extrinsic evidence to disclaim that duty
when the pleadings allege a potentially covered claim. Second, it continued to
adhere to the rule stated in Standard Oil that when pleadings do not clearly
allege a covered claim, the insurer may not simply deny a defense but must
instead first consider extrinsic evidence that points to a potential for coverage.
The court, however, also articulated several caveats to moderate these pro-
insured rules. The court advised that under Standard Oil, insurers need not
168 Id. (emphases in original)
169 Id. at 422, 992 P.2d at 117 (emphasis in original).
0 Id. at 423, 992 P.2d at 118. The court also found a duty to defend under the business
auto policy because there were genuine issues of fact regarding whether the policy included
coverage for Nakamura's truck. Id at 426, 992 P.2d at 121.
"' Id at 418, 992 P.2d at 113 (quoting Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Aetna Life &
Cas. Ins. Co., 483 A.2d 402, 406 (N.J. 1984)). The Hartford Accident court explained, "if a
policy covered a Ford but not a Chevrolet also owned by the insured, the carrier would not be
obligated to defend a third party's complaint against the insured which alleged the automobile
involved was the Ford when in fact the car involved was the Chevrolet." Hartford Accident,
483 A.2d at 406.
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conduct an investigation to establish a potentially covered claim when the
pleadings do not allege one. Additionally, the court held that not all extrinsic
evidence is barred when deciding whether an insured has a duty to defend.
Furthermore, the court allowed insurers to consider extrinsic evidence to
disclaim the duty to defend when that evidence would not be resolved
differently in the underlying lawsuit.172
C. The Significance of Sentinel and Dairy Road
Through these decisions, the Hawai'i Supreme Court during the Moon years
joined the vast majority ofjurisdictions that determine the existence of a duty to
defend based on whether the underlying allegations present a possibility of
coverage under the policy.'73 Generally, the decisions regarding the insurer's
duty to defend are favorable to the insured. Sentinel's rule that insurers must
defend whenever the law is unsettled prevents insurers from asserting untested
legal positions unilaterally to deny a defense, and Dairy Road preserves the
insured's right to a defense in the liability suit based upon what the plaintiff
claims, regardless of how the facts might later emerge.
Notably, however, the Moon Court, in Sentinel, imposed only limited
sanctions against insurers who abandon their insureds, not nearly as harsh as
some jurisdictions have established. Dairy Road placed two restrictions on the
insurer's defense obligation. First, as a limitation on Standard Oil, the court
decided the insurer has no duty to search for extrinsic evidence to create the
potential of coverage where the underlying allegations demonstrate there is no
coverage under the policy. Second, the court allowed the use of extrinsic
172 Ultimately, the court held that Island had no continuing duty to defend because it held
there was no duty to indemnify Dairy Road. The undisputed facts from Nakamura's deposition
established that the accident occurred (1) ten hours after he finished his work day, (2) while he
was driving home, and (3) after having given a ride to a friend. Dairy Road, 92 Haw. at 423,
992 P.2d at 118. Therefore, the court granted summary judgment to Island on the duty to
indemnify. Id. This, according to the court, effectively terminated its duty to defend. Id. It
seems contradictory to refuse to allow extrinsic facts to determine the duty to defend, but to
allow it to decide coverage during an ongoing case. Significantly, the court suggested that an
insured might seek a stay "pending the adjudication of the underlying lawsuit" in response to a
declaratory action on indemnification to avoid this paradoxical result. Id. at 413 n.8, 992 P.2d
at 108 n.8.
173 See Westport Ins. Corp. v. Energy Fin. Servs. LLC, No. 08-5046,2009 U.S. App. LEXIS
6218, at *7 (6th Cir. Mar. 29, 2009) (noting the majority ofjurisdictions have adopted the rule
that "if there is any allegation in the complaint which potentially, possibly or might come within
the coverage of the policy, then the insurance company has a duty to defend"); GC Fin., LLC v.
Old Republic Nat'l Title Ins. Co., No. 3:06-0913, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81385, at *23-24
(M.D. Tenn. Sept. 30, 2008) (noting that "it is accepted in the overwhelming majority of
jurisdictions that the obligation of a liability insurance company to defend . . . is to be
determined solely by the allegations in the complaint").
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evidence in determining the duty to defend where relevant facts will not be
resolved differently in the underlying case. Consequently, the court adopted a
moderate approach to the duty to defend that holds some advantages to both
insureds and insurers.
IV. COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY POLICIES17 4
The CGL policy is the principal form of insurance covering businesses
against liability for bodily injury and property damage. Thus, how courts
interpret CGL coverage provisions can have a substantial economic impact on
an industry. Two important cases, Sentinel and Hawaiian Holiday, provided
important guidance on the meaning of an "occurrence" under a CGL policy in
Hawai'i.
A. Trigger of Coverage Implications
When Multiple Insurers Are on the Risk
During the mid- to late-i 980s, then-Circuit Court Judge Ronald T.Y. Moon
presided over many settlement conferences involving complex construction
litigation. Construction litigation commonly involves multiple defendants
whose defective work is alleged to have caused property damage over a period
of years. CGL policies are typically issued for one-year periods of time. Thus,
construction litigation potentially implicates multiple liability insurance policies
for each defendant, sometimes issued by different insurers. Settlement of these
cases was often frustrated by the defendants' liability insurers taking adverse
positions on the applicable "trigger of coverage," which affected whether the
insurer would be obligated to indemnify the insured defendant against eventual
liability. For example, under the "manifestation of loss" trigger, property
damage occurs when a latent construction defect first manifests itself, and the
insurer on the risk at the time of first manifestation is solely liable for the entire
loss, even if the property damage progresses after the policy expires.175 Under
the "exposure" trigger, coverage is triggered each time a person or property is
exposed to a damage-causing agent. 7 6 Under the "injury-in-fact" trigger,
coverage is triggered by the actual occurrence during the policy period of an
injury-in-fact.' 77 Not surprisingly, because the trigger of coverage affected
which insurer or insurers would be obligated to pay the construction defect
claim, an insurance company advocating a particular trigger of coverage in one
174 The principal author of this section was Keith K. Hiraoka of Roeca Luria Hiraoka LLP.
175 Sentinel Ins. Co. v. First Ins. Co., 76 Haw. 277, 297, 875 P.2d 894, 914 (1994).
176 Id.
177 Id. at 298, 875 P.2d at 915.
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case might advocate for a different trigger of coverage in another case
depending upon the facts of the lawsuit which it was being asked to settle.
In addition to clarifying an insurer's duty to defend, discussed in the previous
section of this article, Sentinel adopted the "injury-in-fact" trigger of coverage
for occurrence-based liability insurance policies.17 8 Briefly, Sentinel Insurance
Company and First Insurance Company of Hawai'i insured a developer at
different times and disagreed as to when certain property damage first
occurred. 17 9 First Insurance maintained that the "structural damage in the way
of water infiltration and associated damage became evident no later than
December of 1982," 8o while Sentinel was on the risk.'' Sentinel maintained
that "[t]he [AOAO] indicated ... that damage from the water infiltration ...
began on or about December 11, 1984"l 82 while First Insurance was on the risk.
After discussing the various triggers of coverage employed by different courts,
the Hawai'i Supreme Court adopted the "injury-in-fact" trigger, reasoning that
"the injury-in-fact trigger is compelled by the plain language of the policies,
and it does not violate the objectively reasonable expectations of the parties or
relevant policy considerations."' 83
Under the injury-in-fact trigger, an injury occurs whether detectable or not-
that is, the injury need not manifest itself during the policy period so long as its
existence during that period can be proven in retrospect.184 The supreme court
recognized that determining when an injury in fact occurs may be a difficult
task requiring expert scientific evidence, but held that proof of the precise onset
of injury was not necessary. The court also recognized that injury may, in fact,
occur over the span of several years and held that, in such a situation, the
"continuous injury" trigger of coverage may be employed to equitably
apportion liability among insurers. 85
Under this theory, property damage is deemed to have "occurred" continuously
for a fixed period (the "trigger period"), and every insurer on the risk at any time
during that trigger period is jointly and severally liable to the extent of their
policy limits, the entire loss being equitably allocated among the insurers. The
trigger period begins with the inception of the injury and ends when the injury
ceases. Before the continuous injury trigger may be applied, the party urging its
1' An "occurrence policy" provides coverage if the event insured against (the "occurrence")
takes place during the policy period, irrespective of when the injured party's claim is actually
presented. Id. at 288, 875 P.2d at 905 (citations omitted).
179 Id. at 285, 875 P.2d at 902.
180 Id.
181 Id. at 286, 875 P.2d at 903.
182 Id. at 285, 875 P.2d at 902.
183 Id. at 298, 875 P.2d at 915.
18 Id. at 297, 875 P.2d at 914.
' Id at 300, 875 P.2d at 917.
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application must make two factual showings. It must be established that: (1)
some kind of property damage occurred during the coverage period of each
policy under which recovery is sought; and (2) the property damage was part ofa
continuous and indivisible process of injury.
The effect of this decision has been to bring all of the insurers that have
accepted payments of premiums to the table when an occurrence spans their
coverage period.
B. Sharpening the Line between Contract and Tort
In 1994, the Moon Court also recognized the distinction between contract
and tort in the liability insurance coverage context-a distinction that would
continue to be made in a subsequent non-insurance-related opinion authored by
Chief Justice Moon,' 7 and which foreshadowed an important 2010 insurance
decision by the ICA."'8
In Hawaiian Holiday, the Hawai'i Supreme Court held that a claim for
breach of contract did not allege an "occurrence" within the coverage of a CGL
insurance policy.'89 The case arose from a dispute between Hawaiian Holiday,
a corporation that grew, processed, and retailed macadamia nuts, and two
limited partnerships.190  Hawaiian Holiday had promoted the limited
partnerships to investors in Dallas, Texas.' 9' The limited partnerships' business
plan was to lease real property in Hawai'i from Hawaiian Holiday, purchase
macadamia nut seedlings from Hawaiian Holiday, and pay Hawaiian Holiday to
plant and tend the seedlings on the leased property and to harvest the
macadamia nut crop.192 Hawaiian Holiday was then to purchase the harvested
nuts from the limited partnerships for processing into retail nut products. 93
"Unfortunately," as noted by the supreme court, "the venture did not progress
as expected[,]"1 94 and the limited partnerships sued Hawaiian Holiday in
federal court in Texas. The Texas complaint alleged that Hawaiian Holiday
made fraudulent misrepresentations in soliciting the investors' purchase of
186 Id. at 298, 875 P.2d at 915 (citations omitted).
187 See Francis v. Lee Enterprises, Inc., 89 Haw. 234, 971 P.2d 707 (1999).
188 See Group Builders, Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 123 Haw. 142, 231 P.3d 67 (App. 2010).
189 Hawaiian Holiday Macadamia Nut Co. v. Indus. Indem. Co., 76 Haw. 166,872 P.2d 230
(1994).
'90 Id. at 167, 872 P.2d at 231.
191 Id. at 167-68, 872 P.2d at 231-32.
192 id
193 Id
194 Id. at 168, 872 P.2d at 232.
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shares in the limited partnerships and breached its farming contracts with the
limited partnerships.'"
Hawaiian Holiday tendered the defense of the Texas lawsuit to its CGL
insurer, Industrial Indemnity Company. 96 Industrial Indemnity declined to
defend.'97 Hawaiian Holiday then sued the insurer in Hawai'i state court
alleging bad faith failure to defend.' 98 The circuit court held that the Texas
complaint alleged a claim for "property damage" and entered summary
judgment for Hawaiian Holiday.'99 The insurance company appealed.2 00
The Hawai'i Supreme Court reversed.2 01 The circuit court determined that
the Texas plaintiffs' allegation that many of the macadamia nut seedlings were
damaged or killed constituted a claim for "property damage." 202 The supreme
court, however, then stated that in order for coverage to potentially exist, the
"property damage" had to have been caused by an "occurrence." 20 3 The term
"occurrence" was defined by the insurance policy as: "an accident, including
continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which results in bodily injury or
property damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the
insured." 204 The court held that the alleged property damage-the damage to
and killing of the seedlings-was "part and parcel of the alleged acts
committed by Hawaiian Holiday that resulted in the claims for breach of
contract and fraud." 205 Hawaiian Holiday's breach of contract, the court held,
was not accidental, and the property damage resulting from the breach of
contract-for which the plaintiffs sought benefit of the bargain damages or
restitution206-was not caused by an "occurrence."
The court concluded by drawing a distinction between claims sounding in
tort and those sounding in contract:
The [Texas] plaintiffs confined their claims for relief to claims for causes of
action for breach of contract and fraud. These claims are not negligence claims
resulting from accidental conduct. Because the CGL policy provides coverage
for accidental conduct only, the underlying complaint did not allege any basis for
195 Id.
196 Id.
197 id
198 Id.
19 Id
200 Id. at 169, 872 P.2d at 233.
201 Id. at 167, 872 P.2d at 231.
202 Id. at 170, 872 P.2d at 234.
203 id
204 Id. (emphasis removed).
205 Id. at 171, 872 P.2d at 235.
206 Id. at 168, 872 P.2d at 232.
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recovery that was covered b the policy. Industrial, therefore, had no duty to
defend Hawaiian Holiday.20
The sharpening of the line between tort and contract drawn during Chief Justice
Moon's tenure signaled the beginning of a substantial contraction of coverage
for construction litigation in Hawai'i.
C. Significance of Sentinel and Hawaiian Holiday
When an injury occurs over multiple policy periods, Sentinel's interpretation
of the trigger of coverage under a CGL "occurrence" policy expanded how
many insurers could be on the risk for defense and indemnity. Sentinel also left
important questions open. For example, questions remain regarding issues of
stacking multiple insurance limits and in what order parties must pay where
primary, excess, and retained risks cover multiple periods.20 8 However, by
providing that all insurers must participate in the cost of defense and
indemnification when an injury occurs over several policy periods, the court's
decision generally favored the interests of the insured.
The Moon Court would later reinforce the doctrinal distinction between tort
and contract drawn in Hawaiian Holiday in Francis v. Lee Enterprises, Inc.,209
a decision authored by Chief Justice Moon. The court in Francis held that a
tort recovery, including a recovery of punitive damages, is not allowed for
breach of a contract in the absence of conduct that violates a duty that is
independently recognized by principles of tort law and that transcends the
breach of the contract.2 10 The ICA would later draw the same distinction-
although directly citing neither Hawaiian Holiday nor FranciS21'-in a 2010
decision holding that breach of contract claims based on allegations of
defective construction and tort claims deriving from those breach of contract
claims are not covered under commercial general liability policies.212
207 Id. at 171, 872 P.2d at 235.
208 See EnergyNorth Natural Gas, Inc. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, 934 A.2d 517, 524
(N.H. 2007) (identifying and discussing allocation and stacking approaches in continuous
trigger cases).
209 89 Haw. 234, 971 P.2d 707 (1999).
210 Id. at 235, 971 P.2d at 708.
211 The ICA's opinion, Group Builders, Inc. v. Admiral Insurance Co., 123 Haw. 142,231
P.3d 67 (App. 2010), extensively discussed Burlington Insurance Co. v. Oceanic Design &
Construction, Inc., 383 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 2004), which cited to both Hawaiian Holiday and
Francis.
212 Group Builders, 123 Haw. 142, 231 P.3d 67.
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V. INSURER BAD FAITH213
In the court's 1996 Best Place decision, Hawai'i finally recognized a bad
faith tort cause of action against insurers. In the four decades leading up to the
decision, nearly every state had adopted some form of the tort of bad faith
specifically against insurers.21 4 The Hawai'i Supreme Court's late recognition
of insurance bad faith can be explained in part by the dominant role the federal
courts play in Hawai'i insurance law. With few domestic insurers, many
important insurance issues are decided by the federal courts sitting in
diversity.215  In light of the mixed signals emanating from state court
decisions, 216 Hawai'i's federal court had consistently held that Hawai'i law did
not recognize the tort of insurance bad faith.217
The facts of Best Place were straightforward. Best Place, a first party
218insured, lost its floundering business in a suspicious fire. For its part, Penn,
the property insurer, balked at paying the claim, as Best Place was slow to
submit its business records for examination.2 19 As the stalemate progressed,
Penn eventually broke off communications, ignoring Best Place's entreaties to
settle the claim.22 0 Best Place filed suit, alleging tortious breach of good faith
and fair dealing.2 2'
Justice Paula Nakayama, writing for a unanimous court, finally held that in
Hawai'i "there is a legal duty, implied in a first- and third-party insurance
contract, that the insurer must act in good faith in dealing with its insured, and a
breach of that duty of good faith gives rise to an independent tort cause of
action.",2 2 2 Thus, although Best Place involved first party insurance, there was
no room to doubt that the court would recognize the tort in both the first- and
third-party context.
213 The principal author of this section was Professor Hazel Beh.
214 See Boyarski, supra note 3, at 848 (observing that Hawai'i was the forty-seventh state in
the nation to recognize the tort "in either the first- or third-party context, or in some statutory
form" and tracing recognition of the tort to Comunale v. Traders & General Insurance Co., 328
P.2d 198 (Cal. 1958), and Crisci v. Security Insurance Co., 426 P.2d 173 (Cal. 1967)).
215 See Hazel Beh et al., Emerging Insurance Issues, 11 HAw. B.J. 6, 16 (2007) (Co-author
Noelle Catalan discussing the role of federal courts in state insurance cases and exploring
possible procedural and jurisdictional options to put cases before the state courts).
216 See Boyarski, supra note 3, at 862-66 (discussing cases both acknowledging the trend in
other states with approval yet also refusing to recognize bad faith in the at-will employment
context).
217 See, e.g., Genovia v. Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 795 F. Supp. 1036 (D. Haw. 1992).
218 Best Place, Inc. v. Penn Am. Ins. Co., 82 Haw. 120, 123, 920 P.2d 334, 337 (1996).
219 id
220 Id
221 id
222 Id. at 132, 920 P.2d at 346.
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In 1996, the decision to recognize the tort of insurer bad faith in Best Place
was easy because nearly every state had adopted the tort of insurance bad faith
at least in some form. The court's greater challenge was articulating the
standard required to establish liability; after all, with four decades of national
case law, a wide variety of legal standards existed for the court to consider.2 2 3
The court reviewed the development of the tort nationally, and ultimately
adopted California's "reasonableness" or negligence standard.2 24 The standard
is a middle-ground choice requiring the plaintiff to prove that the insurer acted
in bad faith or took unreasonable action in dealing with its insured.225 It was a
middle-ground choice because, on one hand, by only requiring the plaintiff to
prove that the insurer acted unreasonably, the insured need not prove that the
insurer acted willfully, maliciously, or deliberately as would be required if the
tort were characterized as intentional as it is in some jurisdictions.2 26 On the
other hand, the standard also granted latitude to insurers by not imposing a
form of strict liability on insurers227 for reasonable but erroneous business
228judgments and interpretations of its obligations under the insurance contract.
223 Id. (observing that "there is a significant variation in the standards by which liability is
imposed").
224 id.
225 Id. at 133, 920 P.2d at 347.
226 Id. at 132-33, 920 P.2d at 346-47 (citing Aetna v. Broadway Arms, 664 S.W.2d 463, 465
(Ark. 1984); Nat'1 Savings Life Ins. Co. v. Dutton, 419 So. 2d 1357 (Ala. 1982); McCorkle v.
Great Atl. Ins. Co., 637 P.2d 583, 587 (Okla. 1981)).
227 For example, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island adopted a fiduciary standard in
Asermely v. Allstate Insurance Co., holding:
It is not sufficient that the insurance company act in good faith. An insurance company's
fiduciary obligations include a duty to consider seriously a plaintiff s reasonable offer to
settle within the policy limits. Accordingly, if it has been afforded reasonable notice and
if a plaintiff has made a reasonable written offer to a defendant's insurer to settle within
the policy limits, the insurer is obligated to seriously consider such an offer. Ifthe insurer
declines to settle the case within the policy limits, it does so at its peril in the event that a
trial results in a judgment that exceeds the policy limits, including interest. If such a
judgment is sustained on appeal or is unappealed, the insurer is liable for the amount that
exceeds the policy limits, unless it can show that the insured was unwilling to accept the
offer of settlement. The insurer's duty is a fiduciary obligation to act in the best interests
of the insured. Even if the insurer believes in good faith that it has a legitimate defense
against the third party, it must assume the risk of miscalculation if the ultimate judgment
should exceed the policy limits.
728 A.2d 461, 464 (R.I. 1999).
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia adopted an even stricter standard,
holding that an insurer's failure to settle within policy limits when it has an opportunity to do so
establishes "that the insurer has prima facie failed to act in its insured's best interest and . . .
constitutes bad faith toward insured." Shamblin v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 396 S.E.2d 766,
776 (W. Va. 1990).
228 Best Place, 82 Haw. at 133, 920 P.2d at 347 (citing Hanson v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am.,
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Allowing insurers to exercise reasonable business judgment without
exposure to excess liability, even when that judgment is erroneous and harmful
to the insured, is a theme that pervades Hawai'i cases. 2 29 The court has
steadfastly asserted that erroneous decisions by an insurer alone would not
amount to bad faith unless the insurer's conduct has also been "improper." 2 30
Similarly, even when there has been bad faith, the plaintiff must establish
"something more" to warrant punitive damages. 2 3 1 "[T]he plaintiff must prove
by clear and convincing evidence that 'the defendant has acted wantonly or
oppressively or with such malice as implies a spirit of mischief or criminal
indifference to civil obligations, or where there has been some wilful [sic]
misconduct or that entire want of care which would raise the presumption of a
conscious indifference to consequences.',, 2 32  Thus, Hawai'i's bad faith
standard represents a middle approach that places a burden on the insured to
prove some negligent culpability. However, by rejecting the notion that the
erroneous judgment speaks for itself, the court pits David against Goliath,
placing a formidable burden on insureds to ferret out impropriety.
B. The Significance of Best Place
The tort of insurance bad faith serves as an important check on insurer
misconduct, and its recognition in Hawai'i was long overdue. In recognizing
the tort, the court implicitly acknowledged its own obligation to police this
uniquely unequal relationship between insured and insurer. It explained:
the adhesionary aspects of an insurance contract further justify the availability of
a tort recovery . . . . [A] bad faith cause of action in tort will provide the
necessary compensation to the insured for all damage suffered as a result of
insurer misconduct. Without the threat of a tort action, insurance companies
have little incentive to promptly pay proceeds rightfully due to their insureds, as
they stand to lose very little by delaying payment.233
The recognition of the tort of bad faith has a normative influence on insurers by
prescribing standards of conduct, providing access to tort remedies, and
promoting accountability.
772 F.2d 580 (9th Cir. 1985); Opsal v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 283 Cal. Rptr. 212 (App.
1991); Olive v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 333 S.E.2d 41 (N.C. App. 1985); Austero v. Nat'l Cas. Co.,
148 Cal. Rptr. 653 (App. 1978)).
229 See, e.g., Guajardo v. AIG Haw. Ins. Co., 118 Haw. 196, 204, 187 P.3d 580, 588 (2008)
(noting that it is a question of fact whether the insurer's refusal to consent to settlement was
based on an "unreasonable" interpretation of its policy).
230 See, e.g., id.; Enoka v. AIG Haw. Ins. Co., 109 Haw. 537, 551, 128 P.3d 850, 864 (2006).
231 Best Place, 82 Haw. at 134, 920 P.2d at 348.
232 Id. (quoting Masaki v. Gen. Motors Corp., 71 Haw. 1, 11, 780 P.2d 566, 572 (1989)).
233 Id. at 132, 920 P.2d at 346.
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VI. MOTOR VEHICLE INSURANCE LAW234
A. Qualification as an "Insured" or "Covered Person"
In Dawes v. First Insurance Co. of Hawaii, Ltd.,235 the Moon Court ruled
that a pedestrian, left stranded by a stalled, insured motor vehicle, was still
"occupying" that vehicle when she was struck and killed by a driver of an
uninsured motor vehicle after walking "twenty to twenty-five minutes and
having traveled approximately one mile from the insured vehicle."236 On its
face, the majority opinion, drafted by Justice Levinson, appeared to defy the
common understanding of the word "occupying," thereby eliciting a lively
dissenting opinion from Chief Justice Moon.237 However, the legacy of Dawes
is the analytical framework it set up to analyze one's qualification as an
"insured" or "covered person"-namely, "class one" insureds, i.e., the named
insured and family members residing in the named insured's household; and
"class two" insureds, i.e., persons occupying, operating, or using a covered
auto.238
In Dawes, Eric Shimp, Elizabeth Jean Bockhorn, and two friends left a beach
gathering in a vehicle owned by Shimp's father and insured by First
Insurance.239 Shimp's vehicle overheated, so the group parked the vehicle
along the highway.240 Rather than wait for a police officer to render aid, the
group decided to walk to the Kona airport "to obtain alternative transportation
and repair assistance." 2 4 1 "[A]fter walking alongside the shoulder of the
234 The principal author of this section was Honolulu attorney Michael N. Tanoue of The
Pacific Law Group.
235 77 Haw. 117, 883 P.2d 38 (1994). Although Dawes was decided by the Moon Court,
Chief Justice Moon (joined by ICA Judge Walter Heen) filed a dissenting opinion.
236 Id. at 119, 883 P.2d at 40.
237 Id. at 133-44, 883 P.2d at 54-65 (Moon, C.J., dissenting). In a concurring opinion
rendered in Liki v. First Fire & Casualty Insurance ofHawaii, Inc., 118 Haw. 123, 185 P.3d
871 (App. 2008), Judge Craig Nakamura of the ICA wrote, inter alia, "[a]lthough I feel
constrained by Dawes to concur in this case, I write separately because I share the concern of
the Dawes dissent . . . ." Id. at 131, 185 P.3d at 879 (Nakamura, J., concurring). Judge
Nakamura continued, "If I were writing on a clean slate, I would adopt the analysis of the
dissent in Dawes. . . ." Id.
238 See, e.g., Foote v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 88 Haw. 122, 962 P.2d 1004 (App. 1998)
(ruling that plaintiff, who was the vice-president, treasurer, director, and fifty-percent
shareholder of the corporation designated as the named insured, did not qualify as a class one
insured because corporations cannot have family members and that the plaintiff did not qualify
as a class two insured because he was not occupying, operating, or using an insured vehicle).
239 Dawes, 77 Haw. at 119, 883 P.2d at 40.
240 id.
241 Id
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highway-well clear of the pavement-for twenty to twenty-five minutes and
having traveled approximately one mile from the insured vehicle," Bockhorn
was struck and killed by an uninsured motor vehicle operated by an uninsured
motorist.242
Jeanette Dawes, individually and as special administrator of her daughter
Bockhorn's estate, asserted a claim for uninsured motorist (UM) benefits
against First Insurance, the insurer of the vehicle owned by Shimp's father.243
In response to First Insurance's denial of the claim, Dawes filed a complaint for
declaratory judgment, seeking a judicial declaration of coverage; First
Insurance responded by answering and asserting a counterclaim, praying for a
contrary ruling.24
At the time of the accident, Hawai'i Revised Statutes sections 431:10-213
and 431:1 OC-301 governed UM benefits.2 4 5 The majority pointed out that
these statutes
are considered to be remedial in nature designed to afford maximum protection to
the state's residents, and to fill the gaps in compulsory insurance plans. Their
purpose is to provide a remedy where injury is caused by an uninsured motorist;
or, as has been more frequently stated, to provide a remedy to the innocent
victims of irresponsible motorists who may have no resources to satisfy the
damages they cause.246
Being remedial in nature, the majority noted that the two UM statutes must be
"construed liberally in order to accomplish the purpose for which they were
enacted."2 47
The majority then noted that two general principles apply to UM coverage:
"[flirst, either 'an insured or an insured vehicle must be involved in the
accident in order to collect under the UM endorsement' ";248 and "[s]econd,
'almost all modem forms of UM coverage include passengers, or occupants, of
an automobile injured by an uninsured motorist; indeed an exclusion of them
would, in most states, be invalid." 24 9 As the majority indicated, these two
242 Id. at 119-20, 883 P.2d at 40-41.
243 Id. at 119, 883 P.2d at 40.
244 Id. at 120, 883 P.2d at 41.
245 Currently, uninsured motorist (UM) coverage is governed only by H.R.S. section
431:1 0C-30 1. Section 431:10-213 was repealed by the Legislature in 1989, "[p]resumably ...
because it was substantially duplicative of HRS § 431:1OC-301." Dawes, 77 Haw. at 122 n.2,
883 P.2d at 43 n.2.
246 Id. at 123, 883 P.2d at 44 (quoting 8C JOHN ALAN APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEMAN,
INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 5067.45, at 41-46 (1981)) (footnotes omitted).
247 Id. (quoting Flores v. United Air Lines, Inc., 70 Haw. 1, 12, 757 P.2d 641, 647 (1988)).
248 Id. (quoting 12A GEORGE J. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 45:634, at 127 (R.
Anderson & M. Rhodes eds., 2d ed. 1981)) (emphases in original).
249 Id. at 123-24, 883 P.2d at 44-45 (quoting 8C JOHN ALAN APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEMAN,
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general principles coalesce and are typically reflected in a "two class paradigm"
of "covered persons" in UM policies:
[O]n the one hand, the named insured, and while resident of the same household,
the spouse of any such named insured, and relatives of either; and on the other,
those who use, with the consent, express or implied of the named insured, the
vehicle to which the policy applies and those who are guests in such vehicle....
And second group persons are only covered when an accident takes place while
they are occupying, operating or using the insured vehicle. This is to be
contrasted with the fact that first group persons are not required to be associated
with the insured auto in order for coverage to attach.... Coverage for thefirst of
the classes listed above, but not for the second, extends to injury suffered while a
pedestrian.250
Put another way,
[i]njury received as a pedestrian generally is limited to the [first class], at least
unless some connection with the insured vehicle is shown.... [N]ot every
departure from a vehicle necessarily divorces one from his status as a covered
passenger. One may be considered still to be "occupying" the vehicle if in
reasonable relationship to it at the time of injury.251
The Moon Court then considered, but rejected, the Washington Court of
Appeals' formula for determining whether the claimant has sufficient
"connection with the insured vehicle" in order for a "class two-insured" to be
entitled to UM benefits. 25 2 The court explained that tests requiring sufficient
connection to the vehicle "fail ... to avoid the anomaly that when 'class one'
and 'class two' persons 'are travelling together, a different result may follow
where injury is received by each." 2 53 The Moon Court then noted that it was
"apparent . . . that application of the Rau test would result in the same anomaly
had Shimp and Bockhom both been struck and killed." 25 4 More specifically,
"Shimp, as a covered 'family member,' would be entitled to UM benefits but
Bockhom would not, although both had been occupants of the insured vehicle
INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 5080.45, at 255-56 (1981)) (emphasis in original). The
majority noted that the word "passenger" means "any occupant of a vehicle other than the
person operating it." Id. at 124 n.7, 883 P.2d at 45 n.7 (quoting BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY
1123 (6th ed. 1990)) (emphasis in original). Thus, the majority elaborated, "for purposes of
UM coverage, a 'passenger' is synonymous with a 'person occupying' a 'covered auto."' Id.
250 Id. at 126, 883 P.2d at 47 (quoting 12A GEORGE J. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE
LAw § 45:635, at 130-32 (R. Anderson & M. Rhodes eds., 2d ed. 1981)) (emphasis in original).
251 Id. (quoting 8C JOHN ALAN APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 5092.35, at 381-82, 386-87 (1981)) (emphasis in original).
252 Rau v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 585 P.2d 157 (Wash. App. 1978).
253 Dawes, 77 Haw. at 127, 883 P.2d at 48 (quoting 8C JOHN ALAN APPLEMAN & JEAN
APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 5092.35, at 381 (1981)).
254 id.
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and both were identically situated with respect to the uninsured Honda
Accord." 25 5 In light of the remedial purpose of the UM statute, the Moon Court
opined that "such a result is absurd." 2 56 "Indeed, [the Moon Court believed]
that a layperson would be shocked to learn that such a result could be reached
by way of legal intellectual gymnastics."25 7
The Moon Court then sternly reminded insurers that requiring "'covered
persons' other than the named insured and 'family members' [to] be
'occupying a covered auto' (i.e., be occupying an insured vehicle) at the time of
injury" under a UM policy was previously declared void "as conflicting with
the Hawai'i UM statutes" in National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Olson.25 8
Because "class-two insureds" need not be "occupants" of an insured vehicle but
must still have "some connection with the insured vehicle" in order to qualify
for UM benefits, the Moon Court then turned to "the heart of Dawes' appeal:
was Bockhom a 'covered person' under the [First Insurance] auto policy at the
time of the accident or was she not?" 2 59 To answer that question, the court
revisited Olson,26 0 which had held that an emergency medical technician setting
a warning flare in the roadway was entitled to UM benefits, despite policy
language limiting coverage to those occupying the vehicle.26 ' While agreeing
with the result, the court in Dawes retreated from the analysis that coverage
extended only to "accidents resulting from activities prescribed 'in the
immediate vicinity of the vehicle."'
2 62
Rejecting formulations that focused on connectedness or proximity, but
mindful of the need for a sufficient "connection with the insured vehicle," the
Moon Court adopted the "chain of events" test articulated by the Oklahoma
Supreme Court in Safeco Insurance Co. ofAmerica v. Sanders:263
(1) if a person was a passenger in an insured vehicle being operated by a named
insured or a named insured's family member, (2) during the chain of events
resulting in injury to the person caused by an accident involving an uninsured
motor vehicle, (3) then the person is a "covered person" at the time of his or her
injury to the same extent as the named insured or the named insured's family
255 id.
256 id
257 Id at 128, 883 P.2d at 49.
258 Id. at 129, 883 P.2d at 50 (citing Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Olson, 69 Haw. 559, 751
P.2d 666 (1988)).
259 d
260 Olson, 69 Haw. 559, 751 P.2d 666; Dawes, 77 Haw. at 130, 883 P.2d at 51.
261 Olson, 69 Haw. at 564, 751 P.2d at 669.
262 Dawes, 77 Haw. at 131, 883 P.2d at 52.
263 803 P.2d 688 (Okla. 1990).
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members would be entitled to receive UM benefits under the applicable UM
policy. 264
The Moon Court applied the "chain of events" test and ruled, as a matter of
law, that Bockhom was a "covered person" because:
(1) Bockhorn was a passenger in the insured vehicle; (2) the insured vehicle was
being operated by Shimp, a "family member" of the named insured; (3) the
insured vehicle broke down; (4) as a result of the breakdown, the occupants of
the insured vehicle, including Bockhom, exited and proceeded on foot to the
Kona airport in order to obtain alternative transportation and repair assistance;
and (5) en route to the group's destination, Bockhorn sustained fatal injuries as a
result of the operation of an uninsured vehicle by an uninsured motorist.265
Chief Justice Moon, with whom Substitute Justice Walter Heen joined,
dissented on the ground that "the majority's analysis [ran] afoul of two
fundamental tenets of statutory construction and imprudently adopted an overly
broad rule that will lead to inequitable and undesirable results."26 6 The dissent
contended that the majority
depart[ed] from the plain meaning of the statute and the legislative history, and
adopt[ed] a rule that will ironically produce the absurd results it allegedly
attempts to avoid ... .267 Under the majority's hypothetical [where both Shimp
and Bockhom are struck and injured], Shimp and Bockhom were indeed both
occupants of the vehicle at one time, and both were struck by the same vehicle.
However, in the context of insurance coverage, the two are worlds apart.268
Under the hypothetical,
Shimp derives his entitlement to coverage based on his status as a family member
of a named insured, who entered into a contract of insurance with the insurer and
paid premiums in exchange for coverage, not because he was an occupant of the
vehicle. As a 'family member,' Shimp's coverage under the policy is relatively
comprehensive.269
"Bockhom's entitlement to coverage, however, would arise only by virtue of
her status as an occupant of the Shimp Family's insured vehicle."2 70
After reviewing relevant portions of the legislative history, the dissent
concluded that
264 Dawes, 77 Haw. at 133, 883 P.2d at 54.
265 id.
266 Id. at 133, 883 P.2d at 54 (Moon, C.J., dissenting).
267 Id. at 138, 883 P.2d at 59.
268 Id. at 138-39, 883 P.2d at 59-60 (emphasis in original).
269 id
270 Id. at 139, 883 P.2d at 60.
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[t]he legislature made explicit its intent to accord full UM protection to a named
insured and his or her family. Nowhere is there voiced a similar intent to accord
coextensive coverage to passengers of insured vehicles, let alone former
passengers, long since separated from the insured vehicle by time, space, and
state of mind. . . . Here, the patent, sensible, and ultimately fair distinction as
recognized by the legislature between Shimp and Bockhorn is that Bockhorn
never paid a single premium to the insurer; accordingly she is not entitled to the
same scope of coverage as Shimp. The supposed "absurdity" as set forth by the
majority is unfounded and cannot form the basis in which to depart from the
intent of the legislature. 271
The dissent closed its criticism of the majority's new "chain of events" test
by portending "virtually limitless coverage once a claimant has occupied an
insured vehicle," especially because "[t]here is hardly any activity in our society
which is not preceded by the use of an automobile." 27 2 In the dissent's view, a
claimant would be entitled to UM coverage simply if he or she is injured by an
uninsured motorist after occupying the insured vehicle, "regardless of time,
physical distance, or, seemingly, even intervening events."273 More
importantly, the dissent pointed out that under the "chain of events" test, there
is no need to examine why the claimant exited the insured vehicle in order to
invoke coverage:
Thus, whether the passenger leaves a vehicle because it breaks down or is simply
parked, or because he or she was dropped off at some destination, according to
the new rule, UM coverage continues to be extended to the former passenger for
some undefined period of time or distance from the insured vehicle. 274
Regardless of the ultimate holding of the majority and the dissenting
opinion's sharp criticism of the majority opinion, the legacy of Dawes is its
clear delineation and explanation of the different classifications of insureds or
covered persons: class-one insureds, as the named insured and "family
members"; and class-two insureds, as those occupying or having some
connection with the insured vehicle.2 7 5 These classifications have served and
will continue to serve courts, insurance law practitioners, insurers, and insureds
well whenever they attempt to analyze questions regarding a claimant's
qualification for coverage under automobile insurance policies.276
271 Id. at 140, 883 P.2d at 61 (emphasis in original).
272 Id. at 143, 883 P.2d at 64.
273 id.
274 id.
275 As the dissent in Dawes points out, there is a third distinct classification of insureds-
persons with respect to damages those persons are entitled to recover because of bodily injury
sustained by class one or class two insureds. Id. at 139 n.7, 883 P.2d at 60 n.7 (quoting 1 ALAN
I. WIDISS, UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MOTORIST INSURANCE § 4.1, at 59 (2d ed. 1992)).
276 A fourth classification of covered persons under an automobile liability policy was
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B. Determination of "Per Person" or "Each Person " Limits
In First Insurance Co. of Hawaii v. Lawrence,277 Chief Justice Moon,
writing for a unanimous court, ruled that, under Hawai'i's motor vehicle
insurance law and the wording of First Insurance's policy, the claims of
negligent infliction of emotional distress ("NIED") asserted by the parents of a
decedent who were not involved "in" the motor vehicle accident that killed
their son were derivative claims limited to a single "each person" limit of
liability applicable to the "host" plaintiff. Frederick D. Lawrence, Jr.
(Frederick) had been drinking beer with some friends, including Orlando
Bitanga.278 Frederick, an unlicensed minor who was allegedly intoxicated,
drove a vehicle owned by Orlando Bitanga's older brother.2 79 The police
attempted to stop Frederick when they noticed he was having difficulty
controlling the vehicle. 280 During the ensuing chase, Frederick struck and
killed Christopher T.F.K. Smith, Jr., a pedestrian. 28 1 The decedent's family
members "were not involved in nor did they witness the accident., 2 82 Smith's
family filed suit against Frederick and his parents and asserted, among other
claims, claims for NIED, loss of consortium, and wrongful death.283 First
Insurance took the position that these claims "were derivative and, therefore,
subject to a single limit of liability coverage under the policy." 284 As a
corollary, First Insurance also argued that "recovery for accidental harm is
limited to persons at the accident scene." 28 5
analyzed in AIG Hawai'iInsurance Co. v. Smith, 78 Haw. 174, 891 P.2d 261 (1995). Chief
Justice Moon, writing for a unanimous court, held that an automobile liability policy afforded
"covered person" status to an alleged tortfeasor who transported alcohol to a beach party on the
day of the accident. Id. at 176, 891 P.2d at 263. Neither the alleged tortfeasor, nor his vehicle,
were actually involved in the accident. Id. The decision was perplexing. After quoting the
relevant portion of the definition of "covered person"-what the court called "clause four"-
and inserting the names of the individuals involved in the underlying lawsuit, the court reached
a conclusion that is apparently neither grammatically nor syntactically correct. More
importantly and of greater impact in the field of insurance policy drafting and insurance
coverage analysis, the Moon Court clarified that an insurer's selective choice of labels for
different classifications of insureds could create mutually exclusive classifications of insureds.
Id. at 183, 891 P.2d at 270.
277 77 Haw. 2, 881 P.2d 489 (1994).
278 Id. at 4, 881 P.2d at 491.
279 id.
280 Id. at 5, 881 P.2d at 492.
281 id.
282 id.
283 id.
284 Id at 6, 881 P.2d at 493.
285 id
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The Moon Court analyzed the relevant statutory provision that abolished tort
liability for accidental harm arising from motor vehicle accidents and its
exceptionS286 and explained:
Although the Smiths claim that their emotional distress claims arose out of a
motor vehicle accident in which Christopher was killed, none of the Smiths
sustained their accidental harm in the accident. Thus, the plain language of HRS
§ 294-6(a) appears to mandate that the Smiths are unable to bring a separate,
independent suit for their alleged emotional distress.287
However, because the statute was "in derogation of principles of common law
tort liability,"28 the Moon Court's analysis did not end there. Rather, the court
noted that the statute "must be strictly construed and, where it does not appear
that there was a legislative purpose in the statute to supersede the common law,
the common law applies."2 89
The Moon Court then "acknowlege[d] that within the tort context, there
exists independent legal protection for NIED claims in this jurisdiction",290 and
that "[t]he absence of resulting physical injury is not a bar to recovery[.]" 2 9 1 In
addition, "'there is no requirement that plaintiffs must actually witness the
tortious event in order to recover,"' 292 such factors bearing instead on the
"degree of emotional distress suffered." 29 3  The Moon Court observed,
however, that "the crucial distinction ... is that the Smiths' NIED claims are
not being reviewed within a 'pure' tort context." 2 94
"Because the Smiths' claims clearly originate from the primary claim-the
death of Christopher[,]" the Moon Court concluded, "such claims are derivative
... in the sense that their viability is dependent on the viability of the main
286 The statute provided, in relevant part, that tort liability is abolished "except as to the
following persons or their personal representatives, or legal guardians, and in the following
circumstances": "(1) Death occurs to such person in such a motor vehicle accident. . ."; "(2)
Injury occurs to such a person in a motor vehicle accident in which the amount paid or accrued
exceeds the medical-rehabilitative limit .. ."; and "(3) Injury occurs to such person in such an
accident and as a result of such injury the aggregate limit of no-fault benefits ... payable to
such person are exhausted." Id. at 8, 881 P.2d at 495 (quoting HAw. REV. STAT. § 294-6(a))
(emphases in original). The current version of Hawai'i Revised Statutes section 294-6 is
Hawai'i Revised Statutes section 431:1OC-306.
287 Lawrence, 77 Haw. at 8, 881 P.2d at 495 (emphases in original).
288 id
289 Id. (quoting Doi v. Hawaiian Ins. & Guar. Co., 6 Haw. App. 456,465, 727 P.2d 884,890
(1986)) (internal citations omitted).
290 id
291 Id (citing Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Haw. 398, 403, 520 P.2d 758, 762 (1974)).
292 Id. (quoting Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Station, 63 Haw. 557, 557, 632 P.2d 1066,
1066 (1981)).
293 Id. (citing Leong, 55 Haw. at 403, 520 P.2d at 762).
294 Id. at 9, 881 P.2d at 496 (emphasis added).
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claim." 29 5 The motor vehicle insurance statute, the court said, "codifies the
treatment of derivative claims consistent with the great majority ofjurisdictions
that do not allow separate 'each person' limits for derivative claims, including
NIED. These courts have held that recovery of insurance proceeds for
derivative claims [is] limited to a single 'each person' limit applicable to the
'host' plaintiff."29 6
Importantly, the Moon Court rejected the Smith family's argument that some
derivative NIED claims could meet a separate tort threshold,297 thereby
potentially triggering separate "each person" limits. The court clarified that
"[e]ven if one of the Smith claimants could meet one of the aforementioned
thresholds, he or she must first meet the threshold requirement that his or her
accidental harm occurred 'in' the accident. Moreover, meeting one of the
aforementioned thresholds does not change the fact that his or her claim is
'derivative."' 2 9
8
In Lawrence, the court noted, it was "undisputed that the Smiths did not
witness the accident nor were they 'timely present at the immediate scene of the
accident."' 2 99 However, the court forewarned that "if the Smiths had been
witnesses to the event that caused Christopher's death, they would have non-
derivative and wholly independent NIED claims that would trigger separate
single limits under the policy as to each proven claim., 3 00
Having concluded that the Smith family's NIED claims were derivative, the
Moon Court then turned to the question of whether the motor vehicle insurance
statute "is consistent with the proposition that derivative claims are limited to a
single per person limit."3 0 1 The relevant statute required, inter alia, that
automobile insurance policies include liability coverage of not less than
$35,000 "for all damages arising out ofaccidental harm sustained by any one
person as a result of any one accident applicable to each person sustaining
accidental harm arising out of ownership, maintenance, use, loading, or
unloading, of the insured vehicle."30 2 The statutory phrase "all damages,"
295 Id. at 9-10, 881 P.2d at 496-97.
296 Id. at 10, 881 P.2d at 497.
297 The tort thresholds referenced by the Smith family were the medical-rehabilitative limit
(which was $6400 at the time of the accident) and the exhaustion of all no-fault benefits (which
aggregate limit was $15,000 at the time of the accident). Id. at 11 nn.1 1-12, 881 P.2d at 498
nn.1 1-12. Under current law, the personal injury protection limit is $5000 and there is no
comparable no-fault aggregate limit. See HAw. REV. STAT. § 431: 1OC-306(b) (2005).
298 Lawrence, 77 Haw. at 11, 881 P.2d at 498.
299 Id. at 13, 881 P.2d at 500 (quoting Crabtree v. State Farm Ins. Co., 632 So. 2d 736, 745
n.19 (La. 1994)).
300 Id. (emphasis in original).
3l1 id.
302 Id. (quoting HAw. REv. STAT. § 294-10(a)(1) (1985)) (emphasis in original). The current
version of this statute is Hawai'i Revised Statutes section 431:1OC-301(b)(1), the comparable
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included in the longer phrase "all damages arising out of accidental harm
sustained by any one person as a result of any one accident," the Moon Court
noted, was construed by three Hawai'i decisions to include "derivative claims
arising from the injury or death of the host plaintiff and are therefore subject to
the 'one person' statutory minimum." 30 3 The Moon Court "agree[d] with the..
. analysis of all three courts and therefore h[e]ld that the no-fault statute does
not require a separate statutory minimum to cover each of the Smiths'
derivative NIED claims." 30
The Moon Court ultimately held that "in the context of Hawai'i's no-fault
law and under the limitation of liability provision in First Insurance's policy,
emotional distress claims under the circumstances of this case are derivative
and as such do not require separate 'each person' coverage to the Smiths."30 5
Eleven years later, in Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Dennison,30 6 the
Moon Court had an opportunity to more clearly define the rule that an NIED
claim asserted by a family member of the host plaintiff is derivative and
therefore entitled to only one "per person" limit, along with the "exception"
that, if the family member was "in" the motor vehicle with the host plaintiff at
the time of the collision or "witness[ed] the actual collision itself," such family
member's NIED claim would be considered independent and subject to a
separate "per person" limit.3 0 7
In Dennison, Tyrone Dennison (Tyrone), a teenager, suffered severe injuries,
including brain damage, in a motor vehicle accident.308 Both of Tyrone's
parents, Donald H. Dennison (Donald) and Lynn Dennison, were not in the
accident vehicle, and "they did not witness the actual collision."3 09 Less than
thirty minutes after the accident, the police went to the Dennison home and
informed the Dennisons that Tyrone had been in an accident and they were
going to transport him by helicopter to a nearby hospital. 310 At the time,
Donald had already heard a helicopter overhead.3 1 1 Immediately after speaking
to the police officer, Donald "ran out the side door of his garage, jumped a wall
portion of which provides that motor vehicle insurance policies shall include liability coverage
not less than $20,000 per person, with an aggregate limit of $40,000 per accident, "for all
damages arising out of accidental harm sustained as a result of any one accident and arising out
of ownership, maintenance, use, loading, or unloading of a motor vehicle."
303 Lawrence, 77 Haw. at 13, 881 P.2d at 500.
3 Id. at 14, 881 P.2d at 501. The court then rejected the claim that First Insurance policy
language provided for coverage even if the statute did not. Id. at 15-16, 881 P.2d at 502-03.
305 Id. at 16, 881 P.2d at 503.
3 108 Haw. 380, 120 P.3d 1115 (2005).
307 Id. at 384-85, 120 P.3d at 1119-20.
308 Id at 380, 120 P.3d at 1115.
309 Id at 382, 120 P.3d at 1117.
310 id.
311 id
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behind his house and ran to the triage area where the ambulance and firemen
had congregated which was down the street from the site of the collision," an
area about the length of a football field from his house.312 Upon arriving at the
triage area, Donald noticed two boys who appeared uninjured, so he knew the
helicopter flying overhead was for his son.3 13
When Donald peered into the ambulance, he saw medical technicians and a
fireman intubating a patient, whose face was partially covered. 3 14 Donald could
not recognize his son until one of the medical technicians pointed out Tyrone,
who was unconscious and completely unresponsive.315 Donald realized his
son's condition was serious when he saw the emergency workers intubating
Tyrone, but no one could give Donald information about the extent of Tyrone's
injuries other than to report that Tyrone would be flown to Queen's Medical
316Center. The medical technician then took Tyrone from the ambulance and
wheeled him by gurney to the waiting helicopter.3 17 During this transport,
Donald could see blood on Tyrone's face.31 s
The Moon Court identified the "sole issue" on appeal: "Whether Donald
[was] precluded from making a claim on a separate policy limit of UIM
coverage for his emotional distress allegedly suffered in the subject. . . motor
vehicle collision, because Donald was not in the motor vehicle with his son
Tyrone at the time of the collision and did not witness the actual collision
itself?"3 "9 The court noted that "[a]lthough the parties in this case agree that,
pursuant to HRS § 431: 1OC-306(b), Donald may not recover insurance benefits
from Liberty Mutual unless he suffered emotional distress 'in' the . . . car
accident, they disagree as to whether Donald was 'in' the accident for purposes
of [that statute]." 3 20 Thus, the more fact-specific issue on appeal, according to
the Moon Court, was "whether Donald, who was not a passenger in the
[accident] car, did not witness the car accident, and arrived 'down the street
from the site of the collision' approximately thirty minutes after the accident
occurred, sustained his emotional distress 'in' the car accident" under the
insurance code and could maintain an independent claim against the insurer.321
The Moon Court acknowledged that, in Lawrence, it had "recognized the
potential for an independent claim by a family member for 'witnessing serious
312 id.
313 id.
314 id
315 id
316 id.
317 Id. at 383, 120 P.3d at 1118.
318 Id
3 Id. at 384-85, 120 P.3d at 1119-20 (first brackets added and other brackets removed).
320 Id. at 385, 120 P.3d at 1120.
321 id
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injury to a close relation coming onto the scene of the event soon
thereafter[.]"' 3 22 However, the Moon Court ruled that the undisputed facts
demonstrated that Donald did not "timely arrive at the immediate scene of the
accident."323 "Rather, Donald learned of the accident while at home and
arrived at the 'triage area' which was 'down the street from the site of the
collision,' . . .approximately thirty minutes after the accident occurred and saw
Tyrone unconscious in the ambulance." 3 24 Thus, the Moon Court held that
Donald was "precluded from asserting a separate and independent UIM
benefits claim for his emotional distress."325
Justice Simeon Acoba dissented, observing that the Lawrence court had
"acknowledged a corollary to the witness exception that included a claim of one
'timely present at the immediate scene of the accident,"' and recognized a
"cause of action for witnessing serious injury to a close relation in either
viewing the event causing the injury or coming onto the scene ofthe event soon
thereafter."3 26 "The parameters of the 'scene' and the measurement of the
'soon thereafter,"' Justice Acoba opined, should have been "issues to be
determined by the fact finder on a case-by-case basis subject only to this court's
determination on 'whether the case presents questions on which reasonable
men would disagree."'
3 27
The significance of Lawrence and Dennison in the context of motor vehicle
insurance law cannot be overstated. The classification of emotional distress
claims as derivative versus independent, and the limitation of such recoveries to
single versus multiple "per person" limits of insurance, help to safeguard one of
the objectives of the motor vehicle insurance law-"to reduce the cost of motor
vehicle insurance by establishing a uniform system of motor vehicle
insurance."328 While those who are "in" a motor vehicle accident may be
entitled to assert independent NIED claims, those who are not "in" the accident
and who therefore did not witness the collision are limited to asserting
derivative NIED claims and recovering under the single "per person" limit
available to the host claimant.
322 Id. at 388 n.8, 120 P.3d at 1123 n.8 (quoting id. at 389, 120 P.3d at 1124 (Acoba, J.,
dissenting)).
323 Id. (quoting Crabtree v. State Farm Ins. Co., 632 So. 2d 736, 745 n.19 (La. 1994)).
324 Id. at 388 n.8, 120 P.3d at 1123 n.8.
325 Id at 388, 120 P.3d at 1123.
326 Id. at 389, 120 P.3d at 1124 (Acoba, J., dissenting) (emphasis added; citation omitted).
327 Id. at 390, 120 P.3d at 1125 (quoting Rodrigues v. State, 52 Haw. 156, 175 n.8, 472 P.2d
509, 521 n.8 (1970)).
328 AIG Haw. Ins. Co. v. Vicente, 78 Haw. 249, 256, 891 P.2d 1041, 1048 (1995) (citations
and emphasis omitted). As the court stated, "the enactment of HRS ch. 431:1 OC benefits
persons injured as a result of motor vehicle accidents, named insureds, and the automobile
liability insurance industry." Id.
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C. Settling UIM Claims without Exhausting Bodily Injury Liability Limits
In Taylor v. Government Employees Insurance Co. (GEICO),29 the Moon
Court examined and ruled upon two common UIM provisions: the consent-to-
settle clause and the exhaustion clause. In that case, Rosalina Taylor (Rosalina)
was injured in a motor vehicle accident involving a tortfeasor insured by State
Farm.330 Rosalina and her husband, Emilio Taylor, were insured under their
own automobile insurance policy, issued by GEICO, which included UIM
coverage.33 As a result of the injuries she sustained in the accident, Rosalina
incurred medical expenses of $15,196.56, was given a medical discharge from
the United States Navy, and obtained an economist's projection of $584,116.00
in future economic losses. 3
After the Taylors filed suit against the tortfeasor, their attorney wrote to
GEICO, the Taylors' UIM carrier, informing it that State Farm, the tortfeasor's
carrier, had offered to settle the lawsuit in exchange for payment of $33,000.00,
just $2000 under the State Farm limits of $35,000, subject to approval of the
Taylors and GEICO.333 The GEICO claims examiner refused to approve the
settlement citing the exhaustion and consent to settle clauses of the policy. 33 4
The exhaustion clause of the GEICO policy provided that "we will not pay
until the total of all bodily injury liability insurance available has been
exhausted by payment of judgments or settlements."335 The consent-to-settle
clause provided that the UIM "coverage does not apply to bodily injury to an
insured if the insured or his legal representative has made a settlement or has
been awarded a judgment of his claim without our prior written consent."3 36
The Moon Court first considered the validity of the consent-to-settle clause.
It held that "consent-to-settle provisions do not necessarily violate either the
337letter or the spirit" of the motor vehicle insurance statute. However, a
consent-to-settle clause, in the court's view, "does not . . . give a UIM
insurance carrier carte blanche to deny UIM benefits to an insured victim." 3 8
Because insurers are required to act in good faith in dealing with their insureds,
the court held that "a UIM carrier's grounds for denying UIM benefits under a
329 90 Haw. 302, 978 P.2d 740 (1999).
330 Id. at 304, 978 P.2d at 742.
332 id.
333 id.
334 id
336 Id. (emphasis removed).
33 Id. at 309, 978 P.2d at 747.
338 id
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consent-to-settle provision in a UIM policy must be reasonable, in good faith,
and within the bounds of the intent underlying HRS § 431:1 OC-301(b)(4)."" 9
Protection of the UIM carrier's subrogation right, the Moon Court noted, is a
"reasonable basis for a refusal to consent to settlement." 34 0 Indeed, "the sole
function of the consent-to-settle clause is the preservation of the subrogation
right." 341 Because the UIM carrier that pays benefits "succeeds to the insured's
rights against the tortfeasor," the UIM carrier may decide to pursue the
tortfeasor if he or she "has sufficient assets to offset his or her lack of
insurance. 3 4 2 Thus, consent-to-settle clauses serve the salient function of
protecting the UIM insurer's subrogation rights.343 The subrogation right,
however, does not give the UIM carrier the right to block a liability settlement
"on the unsupported assertion that it is doing so in order to protect its
subrogation interests." 3" Rather, the UIM insurer must show "prejudice from
the insured's failure to obtain the insurer's consent before settling with the
tortfeasor." 34 5 Put another way, "' [i]f the carrier denies the claim of its insured
without a good faith investigation into its merits, or if the carrier does not
conduct its investigation in a reasonable time,' . . . the carrier may not deny
UIM benefits to its insured."346 In order to assess its subrogation prospects, the
UIM carrier should investigate "the amount of assets held by the tortfeasor, the
likelihood of recovery via subrogation, and the expenses and risks of litigating
the insured's cause of action."347
The Moon Court then addressed the practical problem that the tortfeasor's
liability insurer would unlikely agree to any settlement that does not include a
general release. Such a general release, however, would prejudice the UIm
carrier, whose rights, being no greater than the rights of the claimant, would
then be precluded from pursuing its subrogation claim against a released
tortfeasor. To address this conundrum, the Moon Court held that
an underinsured tortfeasor's automobile insurance carrier discharges its duty to
indemnify its insured when, as a condition of a good faith settlement, it provides
its insured with the protection of an agreement in which the victim releases the
3 Id. (emphasis in original). Hawai'i Revised Statutes section 431:1OC-301(b)(4), to which
the court referred, is the statute that defines UIM insurance in the motor vehicle insurance law.
See HAw. REV. STAT. § 431:1OC-301(b)(4) (2005).
340 Taylor, 90 Haw. at 310, 978 P.2d at 748.
341 Id. (quoting Longworth v. Van Houten, 538 A.2d 414, 419 (N.J. 1988)).
342 id
343 id.
344 Id. at 311, 978 P.2d at 749.
345 id
34 Id. (emphasis in original; citation omitted).
347 Id. (quoting Gibson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 704 N.E.2d 1, 6 (Ohio App.
1997)).
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tortfeasor from all personal claims but preserves the UIM carrier's right of
subrogation.348
The Moon Court then turned to examine the exhaustion clause, which
"requires the insured [to] settle with or obtain judgment against the tortfeasor in
the full amount of the tortfeasor's own liability coverage before the UIM carrier
has any payment obligations at all under the UIM coverage."349 One effect of
an exhaustion clause, the court explained, is that:
the tortfeasor's carrier, by offering to settle for a sum somewhat less than the
policy limits, can force the victim to trial solely in order to protect his UIM
claim. In effect[,] then, the victim is denied the perfectly reasonable choice of
saving months, if not years, of delay, trial preparation expenses, and all the
ensuing wear and tear by simply accepting the offer and, as a condition of
proceeding with his UIM claim, foregoing the difference between the tortfeasor's
policy limit and the tortfeasor's insurer's offer. 350
In light of these deleterious consequences of enforcing the exhaustion clause,
the Moon Court held that "[w]here the best settlement available is less than the
defendant's liability limits, the insured should not be forced to forego the
settlement and [go] to trial in order to determine the issue of damages."
Importantly, however, if the plaintiff "does accept less than the tortfeasor's
policy limits, his recovery against his UIM carrier must nevertheless be based
on a deduction of the full policy limits.,3
5 2
Seven years later, the Moon Court had occasion to provide more guidance to
UIM insurers, insureds, and insurance law practitioners in cases where the
bodily injury liability carrier offers settlement in an amount less than the policy
limits. In Granger v. Government Employees Insurance Co., Margaret Granger
348 Id at 311-12, 978 P.2d at 749-50.
'49 Id. at 313, 978 P.2d at 751.
350 Id. Under Hawai'i law, a liability insurer for a tortfeasor has no duty to negotiate a
settlement in good faith with a plaintiff. Simmons v. Puu, 105 Haw. 112, 121, 94 P.3d 667, 676
(2004) (quoting Long v. McAllister, 319 N.W.2d 256, 262 (Iowa 1982)). But see Young v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 119 Haw. 403, 426, 198 P.3d 666, 689 (2008) (holding that a plaintiff in an
underlying lawsuit may assert a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress against the
third-party liability insurer of the tortfeasor in the underlying lawsuit for "conduct during the
litigation" that caused the plaintiff to experience severe anxiety, worry, fear, and mental and
emotional distress).
3 Taylor, 90 Haw. at 313, 978 P.2d at 751 (quoting Schmidt v. Clothier, 338 N.W.2d 256,
260-61 (Minn. 1983)).
352 Id. (quoting Longworth v. Van Houten, 538 A.2d 414, 423 (N.J. 1988)). Ina concurring
opinion, Justice Paula Nakayama admonished that the result of this case, i.e., the part permitting
UIM claims to be asserted where the underlying settlement requires payment of less than the full
liability limits, should not be construed by liability insurers "as carte blanche to offer lower
settlements without good faith justification." Id. at 315, 978 P.2d at 753 (Nakayama, J.,
concurring).
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was injured in a motor vehicle accident involving Jane Chong.3 53 Granger was
insured under a UIM policy issued by GEICO, and Chong was insured under
an auto liability policy, with a liability limit of $100,000.00, issued by
USAA. 354 After Granger filed suit against Chong, the parties agreed to a
settlement under which USAA, on behalf of Chong, would pay $90,000.00.355
Before finalizing the settlement, Granger wrote to GEICO, her UIM carrier,
requesting GEICO's consent to the settlement with Chong and advising GEICO
that she would be pursuing a UIM claim. 356 GEICO responded that it could
neither refuse to consent nor consent to waive its subrogation right at that time;
instead, it requested additional information regarding Chong's asset
information, potential excess liability coverage available to Chong, and identity
of other UIM carriers applicable to the loss.35
After conducting its investigation, GEICO advised Granger that its UIM
subrogation right "appears viable," that GEICO therefore cannot consent to any
bodily injury liability settlement that fully releases Chong's parents from
GEICO's subrogation rights, and that it was requesting additional asset
information from Chong's mother.35 s Alternatively, GEICO proposed that
USAA and Granger could enter into a "Taylor release."359 Chong (perhaps
through her liability carrier, USAA) balked at the proposal, indicating that the
settlement proposal would be withdrawn if the release provides "anything less
than a full release" by Granger.360  Granger then demanded that GEICO
advance her the $90,000 that Chong (through USAA) had offered in exchange
for a settlement of the liability claim.
The Moon Court adopted the rule of at least eighteen jurisdictions that "after
the UIM insurer has a reasonable opportunity to consider the implications of a
pending settlement, it must either allow the settlement to proceed or tender to
its insured a payment equal to the tortfeasor's settlement offer (up to the limits
3 111 Haw. 160, 162, 140 P.3d 393, 395 (2006).
354 id.
." Id. at 163, 140 P.3d at 396.
356 Id.
3 Id. at 162, 140 P.3d at 395.
358 Id.
3 Id. The term "Taylor release" referred to the kind of release approved by the Moon Court
in Taylor, whereby "the victim releases the tortfeasor from all personal claims but preserves the
UIM carrier's right of subrogation." Taylor v. Gov't Emps. Ins. Co., 90 Haw. 302, 312, 978
P.2d 740, 750 (1999).
360 Granger, 111 Haw. at 162, 140 P.3d at 395.. This stalemate highlighted the practical
dilemma posed by the "Taylor release"--how does a third-party liability insurer satisfy its
obligations toward its insured if it agrees to a partial release that preserves the right of a UIM
carrier to pursue subrogation claims against the insured tortfeasor?
361 id.
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of the insured's UIM coverage)."362 The court then adopted the Alabama
Supreme Court's procedural guidelines for UIM claimants and their insurer in
the event the claimant enters into a proposed settlement with the tortfeasor's
liability carrier: (1) before finalizing the settlement, the claimant should
immediately notify the UIM carrier of the proposed settlement terms; (2) the
claimant should notify the UIM carrier if he or she intends to assert a UIM
claim in addition to the liability settlement so the UIM carrier can determine
whether it will "refuse to consent to the settlement, will waive its right of
subrogation against the tortfeasor, or will deny any obligation to pay [UIM]
benefits; 363 and (3) the UIM carrier should immediately investigate the claim,
conclude its investigation within a reasonable period of time, and notice the
UIM insured of its intended action.364 "The insured should not settle with the
tort-feasor without first allowing the [UIM] insurance carrier a reasonable time
within which to investigate the insured's claim and to notify its insured of its
proposed action." 65  However, if the UIM carrier "wants to protect its
subrogation rights, it must, within a reasonable time, and, in any event before
the tort-feasor is released by the carrier's insured, advance to its insured an
amount equal to the tort-feasor's settlement offer."366
The Taylor and Granger decisions reasonably balanced the interests of UIM
insureds and insurers in situations where, for valid reasons or not, bodily injury
liability carriers refuse to contribute the entire underlying liability policy limits
toward a settlement. On the one hand, the insureds' interests are protected by
362 Id. at 166, 140 P.3d at 399.
363 Lambert v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 576 So. 2d 160, 167 (Ala. 1991). This step in
the Alabama Supreme Court's procedure-which the Granger court apparently adopted-
includes two elements that appear to be at odds with dicta in Taylor. First, the Alabama
approach appears to require the UIM claimant to notify the UIM carrier about the proposed
settlement even if the claimant does not intend to assert a UIM claim. Id. This is contrary to the
statement in Taylor that "an insured party who does not file a claim under his or her UIM policy
is under no obligation to obtain the consent of his or her UIM insurer as a precondition to a
settlement with the relevant tortfeasor or tortfeasors." Taylor, 90 Haw. at 309 n.5, 978 P.2d at
747 n.5. Nevertheless, if the Alabama notice requirement is construed as precautionary-as
claimants may later decide to assert a UIM claim provided such a claim is still timely-then the
Taylor dicta and Alabama element are consistent.
Second, the Alabama approach seemingly allows the UIM carrier to decide to "deny any
obligation to pay [UIMI benefits." Lambert, 576 So. 2d at 167. However, as the Taylor court
stated, "it would not be reasonable for a UIM carrier to deny UIM benefits under a consent-to-
settle provision because it believed that the plaintiff had not actually sustained damages, or
because it believed that the tortfeasor was not underinsured. These are issues that may be
decided by arbitration, pursuant to the provisions of the UIM policy." Taylor, 90 Haw. at 314
n.11, 978 P.2d at 752 n.11.
3 Lambert, 576 So. 2d at 167.
365 Granger, 111 Haw. at 167, 140 P.3d at 400 (quoting Lambert, 576 So. 2d at 167).
366 Id. (quoting Lambert, 576 So. 2d at 167) (emphases in original).
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Taylor's invalidation of the exhaustion clause. On the other hand, the UIM
insurers' interests are protected by Taylor's enforcement of the consent-to-settle
clause in order to protect the UIM insurers' right under Granger to investigate
and decide, within a reasonable period of time, whether to advance the
proposed bodily injury liability settlement to the UIM insured and to pursue the
subrogation claim against the underinsured motorist. These two cases represent
a fortunate confluence of the legal and practical aspects of handling UIM
claims in Hawai'i.
What followed in 2007 was the third of the trilogy of UIM cases dealing with
the consent-to-settle provision and its impact on proposed bodily injury liability
settlements. In Zane v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co., Dawna Zane was a
passenger in a Dodge Neon manufactured by DaimlerChrysler, driven by
Richard Thomas, and insured under both bodily injury liability and UIM
coverages by Liberty Mutual.367 The Neon and another vehicle, operated by
Sarah Kim and insured by State Farm, collided at an intersection, rendering
Zane a paraplegic. 368  Zane filed suit against Thomas, Kim, and
DaimlerChrysler, the latter under products liability theories.3 69  Through
mediation, the parties in the lawsuit reached a settlement under which
DaimlerChrysler agreed to contribute $200,000,370 Kim agreed to pay her
liability limit of $100,000, and Thomas promised to pay his liability limit of
$1,350,000.371 Zane's parents' insurer, AIG Hawai'i, agreed to pay Zane
$40,000.372 Although Zane recovered a total of $1,690,000, the parties agreed
that the value of her claim exceeded that compromised figure.373
Thereafter, Zane asserted a UIM claim under the Liberty Mutual policy. 3 74
The parties agreed that Liberty Mutual initially accepted coverage, but then
refused to tender the UIM benefits on the ground that Kim, the underinsured
motorist from Zane's perspective, was not negligent.375 In addition, the parties
agreed that Liberty Mutual "gave prior consent to the act of settling with
DaimlerChrysler and its codefendants, but disagree as to whether Liberty
Mutual also represented to Zane that it understood and either agreed or did not
367 115 Haw. 60, 64, 165 P.3d 961, 965 (2007).
368 Id.
369 id.
370 Id.
371 id
372 id
373 Id. Although the court characterized this $40,000 payment by AIG Hawai'i as a bodily
injury liability payment, it may have been made pursuant to a UIM policy issued to Zane's
parents and under which Zane qualified as a class one insured. It does not appear that either
Zane or her parents would have been liable for Zane's injuries such that liability coverage
would have been triggered under the AIG Hawai'i policy. Id. at 64 n.3, 165 P.3d at 965 n.3.
374 Id. at 65, 165 P.3d at 966.
375 id.
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dispute that DaimlerChrysler's limitless self-insurance would be excluded from
the calculation of the Taylor 'gap.' 376
The Moon Court ruled that there were genuine issues of material fact as to
the nature of Liberty Mutual's representations to Zane's attorneys regarding the
Taylor gap and as to whether Liberty Mutual should be estopped from arguing
that gap in the lawsuit and on appeal; accordingly, the case was remanded for
further proceedings. 7 The Moon Court also addressed Zane's argument that
the DaimlerChrysler settlement should not be used to compute the Taylor gap
because that gap applies only to liable parties and because DaimlerChrysler,
"having settled for what the parties agree was nuisance value rather than a
liquidation of 'actual' fault, was not a tortfeasor for purposes of the Taylor
rule." In rejecting Zane's argument, the Moon Court provided the following
guidance:
We believe that the choice of whether or not to settle with any particular
defendant, with its consequent benefits and detriments, remains with the plaintiff
even when discovery is fruitless. We disagree with Zane's implication that
adjudication, arbitration, or admission of fault is a precondition of a Taylor
offset. We agree with Liberty Mutual that, where a UIM insured has settled with
an alleged tortfeasor, the UIM insurer is not barred from discounting its financial
responsibility for its insured's damages merely because the insured asserts that
the defendant was not liable, regardless of (1) the defendant's "negligible"
settlement amount and/or (2) the UIM insurer's consent to the mere act of
settling (holding aside the estoppel controversy).
... [W]e believe that a plaintiff/UIM insured who names a defendant and retains
the defendant in the suit all the way to settlement assumes both the potential
benefit of a defendant's ample insurance and the risk that the defendant's [bodily
injury liability] limit may far exceed the feasible settlement value; a defendant's
settlement alone does not extinguish its "tortfeasor" status for purposes of
offsetting a UIM claim.7
376 Id.
377 Id. at 73, 76, 165 P.3d at 974, 977.
378 Id. at 76, 165 P.3d at 977.
379 Id. at 77, 165 P.3d at 978 (emphasis in original). As the Moon Court pointed out, Zane's
argument that an actual adjudication is required for "tortfeasor" status is unavailing. In both
Taylor and Granger, the tortfeasors were not adjudged to be liable, yet they were deemed
"tortfeasors" for UIM purposes. Id. The Moon Court also relied upon a third case, Government
Employees Insurance Co. v. Dizol, 176 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (D. Haw. 2001), in which the United
States District Court for the District of Hawai'i followed Taylor and ruled that "amounts
forgone in below[-]policy[-] limits settlement with joint tortfeasors without the UIM carrier's
consent are properly used to offset the [UIM] carrier's liability." Id. at 1033. As the Moon
Court pointed out, the Dizol court had also deemed the settling defendant to be a "joint
tortfeasor" for UIM purposes without any formal adjudication of liability. Zane, 115 Haw. at
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Importantly, the Moon Court pointed out that Zane raised on reconsideration
an argument that DaimlerChrysler "was not an owner or operator of any
vehicle, let alone an underinsured one." 38 0 At the heart of Zane's argument is
that the motor vehicle insurance law requires UIM coverage for loss resulting
from bodily injury sustained by any person "legally entitled to recover damages
from owners or operators of underinsured motor vehicles."3 81 Zane argued that
"inasmuch as (1) she implicated DaimlerChrysler as a defendant upon a theory
of products liability, and (2) DaimlerChrysler was not an owner or operator of a
motor vehicle, DaimlerChrysler's funds 'have nothing to do with motor vehicle
insurance."' 38 2 The Moon Court ruled that Zane raised this argument too late
and that it was "waived for purposes of this appeal"; but the Court noted that
Zane was "free to raise it on remand." 38 3
Unfortunately for the legal and insurance communities, an appellate
resolution of Zane's new argument-that the Taylor gap is inapplicable to joint
tortfeasors who are neither owners nor operators of underinsured motor
vehicles-must wait another day. On its face, however, the argument finds
support in the wording of the motor vehicle insurance statute, which requires
UIM coverage to apply when an insured is "legally entitled to recover damages
from owners or operators of underinsured motor vehicles."384
77, 165 P.3d at 978.
380 Zane, 115 Haw. at 76, 165 P.3d at 977.
381 HAw. REv. STAT. § 431:1OC-301(b)(4) (2005) (emphasis added).
382 Zane, 115 Haw. at 76, 165 P.3d at 977.
383 Id.
384 HAW. REv. STAT. § 431:1 0C-301(b)(4) (emphasis added). Notably, the statute does not
require UIM coverage only when the accident, or, put another way, all tortfeasors, are
underinsured. Moreover, the wording of the UIM endorsement available for use by insurers
provides in part that "[i]f we make any payment and the 'insured' recovers from another party,
the 'insured' shall hold the proceeds in trust for us and pay us back the amount we have paid."
This condition in the UIM endorsement could be construed to apply to situations where the
UIM policy pays, because an underinsured motorist is deemed at fault, in advance of a
settlement or judgment against other joint tortfeasors.
In AIG Hawaii Insurance Co. v. Rutledge, 87 Haw. 337, 955 P.2d 1069 (App. 1998), a
UM (rather than a UIM) policy issued by AIG Hawai'i included a similar condition, stating: "If
[AIG] make[s] a payment under this policy and the person to or for whom payment is made
recovers damages from another, that person shall hold in trust for us the proceeds of the
recovery and shall reimburse us to the extent of our payment." Id. at 339, 955 P.2d at 1071.
The ICA, in a unanimous decision written by then-Judge Acoba, held that "when an
insured motorist, who has received uninsured motorist (UM) benefits from his or her insurer as
a result of a motor vehicle accident with an uninsured motorist, obtains a tort recovery from the
uninsured motorist or a party jointly liable which fully compensates the insured for damages
sustained in the accident, the insurer may enforce a policy provision requiring the insured
motorist to reimburse the insurer for UM benefits paid." Id. at 338, 955 P.2d at 1070 (emphasis
added).
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As the foregoing demonstrates, the Moon Court actively adjudicated issues
involving the motor vehicle insurance law that, while sometimes perplexing or
frustrating, ultimately provides insurance law practitioners, insurers, insureds,
and claimants with a better understanding of the law. The Moon Court broadly
construed the definitions of "covered person" or "insureds" under automobile
insurance policies; limited emotional distress claims that are derivative in
nature to the "per person" limit of insurance applicable to the "host" injured
plaintiff; and provided guidance in the settlement of UIM claims when the UIM
carrier seeks to preserve its subrogation rights against the underinsured motorist
and/or when the bodily injury liability carrier does not settle for its policy limit.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Moon Court years were active in insurance law. Chief Justice Moon and
his colleagues on the court brought extensive prior judicial and practice
experience in insurance to the decisions they rendered. Although these cases
resolved important issues that were previously unanswered in Hawai'i, the
court more often than not broke little new ground. Instead, the decisions
involved weighing approaches developed elsewhere.
In examining the choices the court made, it is difficult to characterize the
body of decisions as either "pro-insured" or "pro-insurer," either by a simple
tally or by examining the underlying policies it articulated. For example, in
Sentinel and in Best Place, cases generally helpful to insureds, the court
declined to adopt rules that would penalize insurers who make reasonable but
erroneous decisions to the detriment of insureds, even in cases where the
insurer seemingly gambles on an outcome at the expense of its insured. On the
other hand, in areas of coverage, as in Sentinel in the CGL area or Dawes in the
auto cases, it adopted a broad view that favored insureds.
One cannot minimize how valuable it is in insurance cases just to have
important issues resolved, because certainty reduces transaction costs and
expedites resolution of claims. Certainly, attomeys welcomed Finley because it
answered the fundamental question: "Who do I work for?" The cost of
uncertainty in insurance law takes a toll on all parties. Regardless of whether
any single case was rightly or wrongly decided, having answers proves to have
its own value.
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